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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The Si no-Japanese War o f 1894-1895 produced a tremendous 
p o l i t ic a l  and psychological impact on the Chinese Empire. For the f i r s t  
time in modern times, China, was defeated by Japan--a small neighbor 
which long had been considered in fe r io r  to the Great Central Kingdom. 
That humiliating war c le a r ly  revealed the fa ta l  weakness and 
incompetency of the empire, and inspired a r iv a lry  among im p er ia lis t  
powers competing to expand at China's expense. The powers rushed to 
the China scene and demanded th e ir  shares of the Chinese melon, wasting 
no time in taking advantage of the expected breakup of China.
The problem-ridden Ch'ing government could find no e f fe c t ive  
means to re s is t  the demands fo r  special economic and p o l i t ic a l  
priv ileges put forward by these concession hunters. During the few 
years following China's defeat, each major im p er ia lis t  power carved 
out a generous piece o f China as i ts  exclusive sphere of influence. 
China's t e r r i to r ia l  in te g r i ty  and p o l i t ic a l  independence were gravely 
threatened by Russia in Manchuria, by France in southern China, by 
Germany in Shantung, by Japan in Fukian, and by Great B rita in  in the 
Yangtze River V a l le y .1
The war also served as an eye opener to many of China's high 
ranking o f f ic i a l s ,  and p a r t ic u la r ly  members of the in te l l ig e n ts ia ,  
by making them more consciously aware o f the incompetency of the
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empire and the urgency of the need fo r  reform. Petitions and proposals 
fo r  economic, m i l i t a r y ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and in s t i tu t io n a l reforms were 
submitted to the Imperial Government. Among the various reform 
programs, railway construction was given p r io r i ty  as one of the c h ie f  
methods to modernize the country, to develop i ts  in te r io r ,  to 
f a c i l i t a t e  i ts  defense, and to strengthen the authority  of the Imperial 
Government so that one day the Great Central Kingdom might once again 
be on i ts  fe e t ,  a v i ta l  nation capable of competing with the 
im p e r ia lis t  powers.2
One question, however, remained to be answered: where could
China obtain the money needed to build i ts  railways? On the verge of  
to ta l bankruptcy, the Chinese Imperial Government could not possibly 
provide the funds to finance the railway projects. There was but one 
a lte rn a t iv e :  to borrow money from the powers.
China was re luctant to approach the European powers and Japan 
fo r  f inancia l aid because past experience had taught the Chinese that  
these powers surely would make use of the opportunity to acquire more 
concessions from China and to extract more economic and p o l i t ic a l  
p riv ileges . Borrowing money from these powers, the Chinese authorit ies  
feared, would fu rther  weaken China's position and gradually reduce her 
to the status o f a dependency to the im p e r ia l is t  powers. Besides, any 
fu rther  complication in the already chaotic s itua tio n  of the empire 
would probably give r ise  to widespread popular resentment and unrest 
and well could contribute to the downfall o f the Imperial Government.
Out o f th is  consideration, China granted an important railway  
concession~the Peking-Hankow l in e - - to  the Belgians who presumably were 
incapable o f constitu ting a major threat to the Chinese Empire.3
But Chinese o f f ic ia ls  soon discovered that the Belgian corporation was 
but a fro n t fo r  French and Russian f in an cia l in teres ts . "There is 
ground for believing th a t th is  Franco-BeTgian-Russian project was but 
part of an ambitious scheme," Historian Westel W. Willoughby wrote, 
"under which the Russian sphere in the north would be u ltim ate ly  united 
to the French sphere in the s o u t h . T h a t  was exactly what the Chinese 
had t r ie d  desperately to avoid. This turn o f events helped American 
bankers in the contest for the rights to construct another important 
trunk l in e :  the Hankow-Canton railway.
A fter careful consideration, the Chinese government decided to 
seek financia l assistance from the Americans who so fa r  had not taken 
advantage o f China's d i f f i c u l t ie s  by claiming p o l i t ic a l  accommodations 
in return fo r  monetary assistance. In the eyes o f the Chinese, the 
United States was less aggressive than the European powers and Japan. 
Although i t  had enjoyed, and had no wish to re ling u ish , the same trea ty  
priv ileges  and e x t r a t e r r i t o r ia l i t y  in China as the other powers, the 
United States had not, so f a r ,  made war to force concessions from China 
Furthermore, in the f ie ld  of railway development, the Americans had 
accumulated valuable experience through the construction of th e ir  
transcontinental railways.
On 14 April 1898, Wu Ting-fang, the Chinese M in ister in 
Washington, signed a loan contract with A. W. Bash, representative of 
the American China Development Company. In the contract, the 
Development Company undertook to finance the Hankow-Canton ra ilw ay,  
and to supervise i ts  construction and operate the railway during the 
50-year loan p e r io d .5 The Hankow-Canton pro ject was the f i r s t
important concession American bankers had acquired since China had 
turned to seek foreign loans fo r  the construction of i t s  railways.
A fter a survey o f the projected route during the winter of 
1898-1899, the company requested a substantial revision of the loan 
contract to include several branch lines and absolute American control 
of the enterprise. Each o f the four major branch lines proposed by 
the company was, by i t s e l f ,  long enough to be an independent railway. 
Together with the Hankow-Canton l in e ,  they would cover two th irds of  
southern China.
The Chinese government considered the American terms excessive 
and unacceptable, and was determined not to approve them.6 The loan 
negotiations was deadlocked fo r  a f u l l  year. Eventually, the 
Development Company took the in i t i a t i v e  to break the deadlock by 
stepping back from some of i ts  o rig ina l proposals. On 13 July 1900, 
a supplementary agreement was reached which contained none of the major 
branch lines desired by the company. The company also relinguished i ts  
insistence on absolute American control o f the l in e  during the loan 
p e r io d .7 There was much r e l i e f  upon the conclusion of the contract, 
yet i t  was too early  to be optim is tic  about the future  of th is  enter­
prise .
The Chinese government granted th is  important concession to the 
American China Development Company with the express purpose o f avoiding 
p o l i t ic a l  entanglement with the European powers, whose position and 
influence already had been too s o lid ly  established within the empire. 
China's concern over i t s  in te g r i ty  was emphatically specified in 
A rt ic le  17 o f the Hankow-Canton contract which provided that
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no transfer o f r ights to any other nation or nationals would be 
perm itted .8
The a r t ic le  c le a r ly  revealed the Imperial Government's fear of  
foreign domination and i ts  incompetency to manage i ts  domestic a f fa i r s  
and deal with the powers. The Imperial Government was too weak to 
challenge the deeply entrenched foreign in terests  in China. The only 
game l e f t  fo r  i t  to play was not how to reduce or elim inate foreign  
spheres o f in te re s t  in China, but how to maintain the balance of con­
cessions among the powers. Only by playing the powers against each 
other and by keeping them in constant r iv a lr y  would the empire have a 
chance to survive. Any sharp increase or decrease of the strength and 
influence of one p a r t ic u la r  power might well disturb the de licate  
balance and pose a serious threat to the empire's very existence.
That was why China insisted that A r t ic le  17 be included in the 
supplementary agreement as a guarantee that the Americans, not the 
B rit ish  or the French or the Russians or others, would control th is  
stra teg ic  l i n e . 9
There is l i t t l e  doubt that the company o f f ic ia ls  perfec tly  
understood the message carried by th is  v i ta l  provision and the grave 
p o l i t ic a l  s itua tion  of the empire. Yet, consciously or unconsciously, 
the company ignored th is  provision and allowed i ts  stock to be marketed 
in order to make a p r o f i t .  The Bel gins, representing Russian and 
p a r t ic u la r ly  French in terests  and seeking to undercut the American 
pro jec t, bought control of the company in the open m arket.10
This ou tr ight v io la tion  of the agreement placed the Chinese 
government in a d i f f i c u l t  position re placating the opposition o f the
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provincial leaders who demanded the return o f railway rights to th e ir  
hands and feared foreign domination of th e ir  economic and p o l i t ic a l  
a f fa i r s  through the construction and operation of th is  trunk l in e .
They feared not without cause what the Russians and Japanese had done 
in Manchuria. I f  the French-Russian in terests  should now gain hold 
of the Hankow-Canton railway through the purchase o f stock from the 
American company by th e ir  Belgian representatives, China's railway  
system from i ts  northern to i ts  southern border would be controlled by 
the French and the Russians. The transaction would gravely disturb  
the balance of foreign in terests  in China, establish French-Russian 
domiance over the economic a f fa i r s  o f a large part of the empire with 
obvious p o l i t ic a l  consequences, and give rise  to more turbulent internal  
ag ita tio n  and unrest.
Since the Opium War of 1840 and especia lly  since the Taiping 
Revolution of 1851, the Manchu government had declined rapidly  and 
had lo s t much of i ts  control over the provinces. Any further foreign  
encroachment upon China's rights or concession made to the powers 
could, at any time, cause v io len t popular reaction and easily  lead 
to an anti-Manchu revolution. What the American bankers were concerned 
about was how much money they could make through the sale of the 
company's stock in the open market. What concerned the Imperial 
Government was the very existence of the empire. Outraged by the 
conduct of the company and confronted by enormous pressure from the 
provinces, the Chinese government decided to cancel the American 
concession. Other reasons fo r  th is  drastic  measure were due to the
delay and high cost of the construction, mismangement of the enterprise  
and inappropriate use of the funds.11
Although the company had been deeply penetrated by foreign  
c a p ita l ,  the American government regarded the company as "in good fa i th  
American" and had declared that the American government would take the 
sole resp ons ib il i ty  to deal with a l l  diplomatic problems a ffec ting  the 
company and continue to protect the rights o f the company.12 Seeing 
that the Americans had no in tention of admitting th e ir  v io la tio n  o f the 
contract or of taking measures to remedy the s itu a t io n , Shen Hsuan-huai 
Director General o f the Hankow-Canton ra ilw ay, responded by ordering 
the American depository on 22 June 1904 to refuse fu rth er  bond 
d e liveries  to the company. Construction on the e n tire  l in e  stopped.13
This time, American financiers took China's warning seriously. 
J. P. Morgan and Company, in an e f fo r t  to save the enterprise , managed 
to buy back from the Belgians a m ajority  share of the company's 
s to c k .llt Urged by American f inancia l in te re s ts , and assured that the 
company was back in American hands, Secretary of State John Hay started  
a new round of diplomatic actions on behalf of the company. He 
declared that the American government would not " to le ra te  such an act 
of s p o lia t io n ,"  especia lly  since the Americans had regained control 
of the company a f te r  "great s a c r i f i c ie s .1,15
Because of strong provincial opposition to the loan, the Manchu 
government was a fra id  of taking any step tha t might in ten s ify  the 
widespread discontent and unrest in the provinces.16 The Imperial 
Government could not afford  to gamble with the destinay of the empire 
merely to please the claims of American railway financiers .
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Besides, the conduct of the Development Company in the past gave the 
Chinese reason to doubt i ts  s in c e r ity  to carry on the pro ject. The 
Chinese government had made up i ts  mind to cancel the loan and offered  
to make reasonable compensation to the company fo r  the termination of  
the c o n tra c t .17
To avoid d ire c t  confrontation with the American government, the 
Chinese legation in Washington qu ie tly  approached representatives of  
the company fo r  a. settlement o f the dispute. On 3 June 1905, an 
agreement was reached between the two parties . China agreed to pay 
$6,750,000 indemnification to cover the railway properties and the 
bonds sold by the company.18 The terms of the settlement were onerous 
to the Chinese. The indemnity they were compelled to pay, although 
greatly  reduced from the orig ina l American claims of $18,000,000, 
was s t i l l  $3,750,000 in excess of what the Americans had spent.19
The American M in ister in Peking, Mr. W. W. R ockhill, was 
strongly opposed to the sale of the concession. In his cable to 
President Theodore Roosevelt, he severely c r i t ic iz e d  the company and 
pointed out th a t ,  as a resu lt  o f the transaction, the Hankow-Canton 
railway pro ject probably would f a l l  into the hands of the European 
powers which would produce harmful e ffects  on American commercial 
in terests  in China. He fu rth e r  stated that the cancellation of the 
enterprise had shaken b e l ie f  in American business in te g r i ty  and that  
American financiers would not be able to get new concessions fo r  years 
to come.20 Rockhill reported to the new Secretary of S tate , Elihu 
Root, that the company was taking advantage of China's d i f f i c u l t ie s  
and China's desire to regain control o f the railway by s e ll in g  the 
enterprise a t an exorbitant p r ic e .21
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Roosevelt also was against the sale o f the concession. He 
promptly intervened and asked the American bankers to stay in the f ie ld  
even though that meant a temporary setback to th e ir  best f in an cia l  
in te res ts . In his l e t t e r  to J. P. Morgan, he guaranteed f u l l  
governmental support of the bankers and urged Morgan against the 
c a n c e l la t io n .22 Roosevelt's argument against the cancellation of the 
concession derived large ly  from his general conception of American 
prestige and in terests  abroad. He was not so much concerned about 
the company and the project as he was about the honor and c r e d ib i l i t y  
of the United States. In his opinion, American in terests  in China 
would be endangered i f  the Chinese were allowed to annul foreign  
contracts a t w i l l .  He wanted to show the Chinese that the American 
government was always ready to protect the American commercial 
in terests  abroad. He believed tha t keeping the concession would pay 
o f f  in the long ru n .23
Nevertheless, a majority of the company's directors and 
shareholders were apparently s a t is f ie d  with the handsome p r o f i t  they 
could extract from the heavy indemnity, and they were determined to 
s e l l .  The shareholders o f the company voted on 29 August to accept 
the indemnity agreement of June 1905.24 Seeing that the decision for  
cancellation was ir re v e rs ib le ,  Acting Secrerary o f State Francis B.
Loomis n o tif ie d  the Chinese M in ister in Washington on behalf of the 
American government th a t ,  because the company had decided to se ll  
the concession, the United States Government would not in te r fe re  with  
the se ttlem ent.25 Thus, a f te r  continuous bargaining and haggling fo r  
seven years and three months, with l i t t l e  accomplishment, the
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American China Development Company lo s t  the only important concession 
obtained by Americans during the battle of concessions a f te r  1895.
The cancellation of the Hankow-Canton concession injured  
American prestige in China. The high price exacted by the American 
company l e f t  substantial i l l  W ill among the Chinese toward American .. 
c a p ita l .  Three years la te r ,  when the United States again entered the 
contest fo r  the control of the Hukuang ra ilw ays, natives o f the affected  
provinces s t i l l  were resentful of the actions of the American China 
Development Company. Former M in ister to China Rockhill referred to 
the cancellation o f the concession as the "greatest single loss the 
United States had suffered in China."26 The importance attached to 
the Hankow-Canton project re flected  a growing conviction that i f  the 
United States were to have a voice in China, i t  must have investments 
there. With investments went trade and influence. Without them, 
American business in te re s t could never expect to gain a foothold in the 
China market.
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Chapter 2
AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE HUKUANG LOAN
A fter  the Hankow-Canton railway was redeemed from the Americans 
by the Imperial Government, the local gentry o f the affected provinces 
agitated fo r  placing the railway business into th e ir  hands as a
private  business and began to raise funds with the in tention of
building the railways through th e ir  e f fo r ts .  Construction was started  
in Canton in 1906 and sections of ra i ls  were la id  in the Kwuangtung 
section o f the Hankow-Canton trunk l i n e . 1
The example o f  the Cantonese in financing and building th e ir  
railways was en thu sias tica lly  followed in other provinces and, before 
long, a nationwide movement to undertake railway construction through 
provincial e f fo r ts  was taking form. Numerous organizations sprang up 
to raise private  capita l fo r  the construction of th e ir  railways.
Public sentiment in favor o f independent railway construction was so 
strong and i r r e s t ib le  that the Imperial Government acquiesced in this  
n a t io n a lis t ic  movement.2
Despite a display o f  patriotism  and public enthusiasm, however, 
l i t t l e  was accomplished. The Hunan provincial au thorities  planned to
complete the section of the Hankow-Canton lin e  within the Hunan border,
but they managed to construct no more than 32 miles o f the l in e  
between Changsha and Chuchow a t  a cost of CN$8,000,000. The Hupeh 
au tho rit ies  raised an in s u f f ic ie n t  sum of CN$450,000 to build the
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section within the Hupeh province and accomplished nothing u n ti l  the 
Imperial Government had contracted the Hukuang loan with the powers.3 
The capita l required for the construction o f a major trunk l in e  such as 
the Hankow-Canton railway was enormous and fa r  beyond the a b i l i t y  of 
China's financia l organizations o f the period. The railway projects  
that had been undertaken proved to be fa r  too ambitious fo r  the 
financia l capacity o f the local gentry, and they in variab ly  fa i le d .
With the exception o f Kwuangtung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, none o f the other 
provinces had the means of carrying out even a substantial part of  
i t s  plans. The dream of constructing the en tire  l in e  from Canton to 
Hankow through provincial e f fo r ts  remained la rge ly  u n fu l f i l le d .  By 
1909, i t  was c lear that only the national government could undertake 
the resp ons ib ility  of constructing the n a tio n ’ s railway system.4
In 1909, Sheng Hsuan-huai, D irector General of the Board of 
Ports and Communications, sent a memorandum to the Throne in which he 
urged the Imperial Government to nationa lize  a l l  railway enterprises  
in China and to take over a l l  railway Tines b u i l t  by private  c a p i t a l .5 
Director Sheng's aim was to remedy the fa i lu re  of private  capital, and 
to speed up China's railway development through the e ffo r ts  of the 
central government. Sheng's p e tit io n  soon was approved by the Throne. 
Henceforth, according to the Imperial e d ic t ,  a l l  trunk lines were to 
belong to the government and a l l  the railway companies organized in 
the provinces were a t once to revert to the government. The govern­
ment would complete these railway projects without fu rth er  delay.
Branch lines might s t i l l  be constructed by local au tho rit ies  and 
private  enterprises, but a l l  previous permits from the Imperial 
Government fo r  the building of trunk lines were cance lled .6 The
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f i r s t  railway taken over by the Imperial Government was the Hankow- 
Canton lin e  which the local gentry o f Kwuangtung, Hunan, and Hupeh 
had fa i le d  to complete a f te r  f iv e  years of controversy.7
The natio n a liza tio n  program was one of the government's few
choices and probably was in the best in terests  of the nation. Again,
the problem was f in a n c ia l:  where could the government firid enough
funds to carry out th is  program? Without s u f f ic ie n t  means to f u l f i l l
i ts  ambitious goals, the Imperial Government again turned to seeking
foreign f in an cia l assistance fo r  the construction o f i ts  railways.
*  *  *
The European powers long had coveted the rich  economic 
prospects o f  railway enterprises in southern China. Even before 
China's na tio n a liza tio n  program was formulated, the powers had begun 
serious discussions among themselves about financing railway projects  
in southern China without any previous consultation with the Chinese 
government.8 Despite the frus tra tions  of the American China 
Development Company, the American government had no intention of 
leaving the China scene and relinquishing the e n t ire  f ie ld  of 
investment to the Europeans. Even before the cancellation of the 
Hankow-Canton concession was made f i n a l ,  the Americans became 
interested in the construction o f  another railway trunk lin e  link ing  
Hankow with Szechuan—one o f  the r ichest provinces in the empire.
In the summer of 1903, M in ister E. H. Conger learned that  
the Chinese railway administration was planning th is  l in e .  To prevent 
competition from other powers, Conger promptly applied to the Chinese 
government fo r  the rights to construct th is  l in e .  At about the same 
time, the B r it is h  approached the Chinese government fo r  this
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concession. They were n o tif ie d  by the Chinese government th a t ,  i f  
provincial au thorit ies  should f a i l  to raise enough funds fo r  the 
construction o f th is  l in e ,  American and B rit ish  in terests  would be 
consulted as to the rights to finance th is  ra i lw a y .9
Neither the Americans nor the B rit ish  made much headway. The 
provincial au thorit ies  s t i l l  were trying to raise money to construct 
the l in e  through th e ir  e f fo r ts .  The Imperial Government was cautious 
and had no wish to in ten s ify  the tension between the provinces and 
the central government. Encouraged by the American legation in 
Peking, several bids had been made by American syndicates fo r  the 
Hankow-Szechuan pro jec t, but the Chinese government did not give i ts  
consent and refused to make any commitment. The American bankers 
consequently lo st much of th e ir  in te re s t in the enterprise and turned 
elsewhere fo r  investment o p p o rtu n it ies .10
The B rit ish  did not give up e a s ily . B rit ish  and French bankers 
met in London in October 1904 to discuss the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f organizing  
a jo in t  company and merging forces to finance and build the Szechuan- 
Hankow railway. Through the American legation in Peking, they also 
extended an in v ita t io n  to American financiers to jo in  the pro ject. On 
two occasions, 25 July 1905 and 19 September 1905, the B rit is h  
ambassador in Washington inquired a t  the State Department about whether 
or not American c a p ita l is ts  desired to p a rt ic ip a te  in th is  e n te rp r is e .11
The State Department urged American financiers to consider the 
B rit ish  o f fe r  but fa i le d  to arouse s u f f ic ie n t  American in te re s t in the 
pro ject. Wishing to reserve American rights to the concession, the 
State Department informed the B r it is h  government th a t ,  although the
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department was not able to supply an immediate reply to the B rit ish  
inquiry , the American government by no means had relinquished the 
r ig h t  o f  American cap ita l to p a rt ic ip a te  in th is  e n te rp r is e .13 The 
B rit is h  authorit ies  were impatient with the ir reso lu te  American answer 
and urged the Americans to give a d e f in ite  reply a t an early  date. On 
27 September 1905, in his le t t e r  to the B rit is h  ambassador, Acting 
Secretary of State Loomis expressed his regret th a t the State Department 
s t i l l  was unable to inform the B rit ish  government of the intentions of 
American c a p ita l is ts  in connection with the proposed railway project  
from Hankow to Szechuan.14
Since American bankers had not shown any real in te re s t  in the 
enterprise , the B rit is h  and French in terests  with th e ir  new partner, 
the German group, decided to proceed with the loan negotiations. The 
railway negotiations revived in fu l l  a s p i r i t  of competition among the 
B r i t is h ,  French, and German financia l groups. A fte r  a long and 
arduous negotiation, an agreement was reached and in i t ia le d  by the 
representatives of the Chinese government and B r i t is h ,  French, and 
German banks in Peking fo r  a loan of £5,500,000 on 6 June 1909. The 
loan was negotiated fo r  the construction of the Hukuang railways which, 
according to the contract, comprised the Hupeh section o f the Hankow- 
Szechuan lin e  and the Hupeh and Hunan sections o f the Hankow-Canton 
l in e .  The loan was guaranteed by the Chinese government and was 
secured by revenues o f the projected railways and general l i k in  
(a Chinese provincial tax at inland stations on imports or a r t ic le s  
in t r a n s i t )  and import taxes of the Huhan and Hupeh provinces. The 
agreement was to be formally signed when approved by Imperial e d ic t .15
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Through an arrangement between the three banking groups, the Germans 
surrendered th e ir  recently  concluded Hankow-Canton loan to the B r i t is h ,  
the B rit ish  gave the Hankow-Szechuan loan to the Germans, and the French 
received a one-third share in both loans andsa 5 percent commission on 
the purchase o f railway materials used in the construction .16
The American State Department had not lo s t i ts  in te re s t in 
railway investment in southern China. Late in May 1909, the State  
Department learned of the negotiations between the three foreign  
banking groups and the Chinese government through press reports. 
According to these reports , the loan being negotiated would cover not 
only the Hankow-Canton pro ject but the Hankow-Szechuan l in e  a ls o .17 
The American government immediately reminded the Chinese and B rit ish  
governments th a t ,  by promise made in le t te rs  to the American M in ister  
in Peking by the Chinese government in 1903 and 1904, any foreign  
concession for the Hankow-Szechuan l in e  was f i r s t  to be offered to 
B rit is h  and American companies.18 By the inclusion of th is  l in e  in 
the loan negotiations, American business in te re s ts , contrary to the 
promises made by China, were being excluded from pa rt ic ip a tio n  in the 
concession.
On 5 June 1909, one day before the conclusion of the loan 
agreement between the European bankers and the Chinese government, 
the American chargd d 'a f fa ire s  in Peking, Henry P. F letcher, acting  
under instructions from the State Department, sent a l e t t e r  to Prince 
Ch'ing, head of the Chinese Foreign O ffice , explaining the American 
position and try ing  to make the Chinese government reconsider i ts  
transaction with the European bankers. In his l e t t e r ,  Fletcher
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reasserted that the United States had taken no action which could be 
construed as a relinquishment o f the r ig h t of American cap ita l to 
p art ic ip a te  in th is  enterprise. He requested that Prince Ch'ing 
n o tify  Viceroy Chang Chih-tung and other o f f ic ia ls  in charge o f  the 
enterprise that the American government insisted that the assurances 
of 1903 and 1904 be observed, and that American c a p ita l is ts  be 
consulted and allowed to p a rt ic ip a te  in the loan about to be f lo a te d .19
Washington's deepening in teres t in financing railway enterprises  
in China obviously was encouraged by the railway natio na liza tio n  
movement in China and the f r u i t f u l  opportunities th is  development 
would bring about. The construction of railways was the ch ie f means 
of in ternal development in China. I t  would open the way fo r  greater  
investment of foreign cap ita l and create a la rger market fo r  foreign  
manufactured goods. Being denied the r ig h t to p a rt ic ip a te  in the 
railway loans would mean loss of markets and investment opportunities.
The European financia l groups and the Chinese au thorit ies  
were annoyed by the United States' la s t  minute request. None of them 
had any in tention of le t t in g  the Americans p a rt ic ip a te  in the present 
loan because American financiers  never had given an a ff irm a tive  response 
to th e ir  repeated in v ita t io n s . Now that the agreement was about to be 
concluded, a f te r  so much time and energy had been spent, neither side 
wanted to see the United States squeeze in and break the understanding 
that ju s t  had been reached between clashing in tere s ts . None of them 
had the patience to reopen negotiations merely to please American 
business in te re s ts . Despite loud protests from the Americans, the
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Imperial Government in i t ia le d  the Hukuang Loan Agreement with the 
B r it is h ,  French, and German f in an cia l groups on 6 June 1909.20
China had a reason fo r  concluding the agreement as fas t as 
possible. For years, there existed in the Hukuang provinces a "strong 
opposition to the borrowing of foreign cap ita l"  fo r railway  
construction .21 The Imperial railway natio na liza tio n  policy had 
aroused v io len t protests from the provinces, and a movement to recover 
railway concessions from the control of foreign powers had spread to 
several provinces.22 Chinese pa tr io ts  resented foreign encroachment 
upon China's ra ilways, resources, t e r r i to r i e s ,  and p o l i t ic a l  in te g r i ty .  
This popular resentment had been nourished by more than h a lf  a 
century's foreign intervention in China's domestic a f f a i r s ,  economic 
and p o l i t i c a l .  Past experience had taught the Chinese that they could 
not expect any genuine help from the powers to modernize th e ir  
country. The construction of each railway with foreign cap ita l always 
had been followed by the extension o f the p o l i t ic a l  and economic 
rights and priv ileges o f one or more powers in China.
The heavyhanded dealings of American financiers and th e ir  
disrespect fo r  contractual obligations in the case of Hankow-Canton 
enterprise in fu r ia ted  the provincial gentry and made them extremely 
suspicious of foreign c a p i ta l . Besides, th is  widespread antiforeignism  
was mixed with a strong anti-Manchuism. The Imperial Government under 
the Manchus often was blamed fo r  a l l  the e v ils  and misfortunes China 
had suffered since the Opium War. I t  was not an unpopular b e l ie f  
that the Manchus had approached the end of th e ir  dynastic cycle and 
that th e ir  ru le  should be replaced by something new. Foreign loans
21
and concessions therefore often had been c ited  as proof of the 
government's betrayal of national in teres ts .
The fundamental a t t i tu d e  of the Imperial Government toward 
foreign encroachment was not so much d if fe re n t  from that of the 
provincial gentry. In one respect, the Manchu ru lers were as 
anti foreign as th e ir  subjects, but th e ir  antiforeignism  was exhibited  
in a fundamentally d i f fe re n t  way. The Manchu rulers knew very well 
th a t ,  unless the empire was substantia lly  strengthened m i l i t a r i l y  
and in d u s tr ia l ly ,  i t  never would be able to re s is t  foreign  
encroachment. They changed th e ir  tac tics  from open confrontation to 
borrowing money and technology from the Western powers fo r  the purpose 
of building up China's strength. They hoped that China eventually  
would revive i ts  past grandeur and successfully compete with the 
powers. This was a new kind of antiforeignism . However impractical 
th is  policy might have been, the purpose of the Manchu rulers was not 
to accommodate the foreign concession hunters but to r e v i ta l iz e  the 
dying empire and eventually overcome foreign encroachment. Under the 
Ch'ing government, without a drastic  revolution to change the dynastic 
system, th is  could only be a dream. The Self-strengthening Movement 
a t  the end of the nineteenth century, and the reform e ffo r ts  before 
the 1911 Revolution, were a l l  part o f the Imperial Government's grand 
e f fo r t  to salvage the to tte r in g  empire and eventually re s is t  foreign  
encroachment and invas ion .23
The haste shown by the Imperial Government to have the contract 
in i t ia le d  may be understood when local conditions in southern China 
are considered because there would be less opportunity fo r  local 
radicals  to ag ita te  i f  the government, through Viceroy Chang Chih-tung
who enjoyed great prestige and authority  among the prov incia ls , pushed 
ahead i ts  railway plan without hesita tion and argument. The agreement 
with the three banking groups was especially  welcome to Chang 
Chih-tung because i t  prevented a prolonged period of wrangling over 
terms. American p artic ipa tion  in the loan could only disturb the 
settlement and s ta r t  a new round of negotiations which could 
in d e f in i te ly  delay and eventually destroy the railway construction 
program o f the Imperial Government due to the unpredictable provincial 
opposition.
A fte r  the signing of the June agreement, not only did 
Chang Chih-tung object to American in tervention , but so did the three 
foreign groups, because any delay now might in va lida te  what had been 
accomplished. The B rit ish  p a r t ic u la r ly  were resentful of American 
in terference. In a memorandum to the American State Department, S ir  
Edward Grey, the B rit ish  Froeign M in is ter , informed the State Department 
th a t London had decided to proceed in the loan negotiations with the 
Chinese government on the assumption that American c a p ita l is ts  did not 
desire to p artic ip a te  a f te r  th e ir  repeated in v ita t io n s  extended to 
American bankers had not received any favorable response.i
Grey pointed out that these negotiations had been a matter of  
common knowledge and that a t no time since th e ir  inception had any 
in tim ation been received of a desire o f American financiers to take 
part in them. Therefore, declared Grey,
His Majesty's Government would scarecely feel justified in 
interfering with the arrangements concluded, after such protracted 
and arduous negotiations and under their auspices, by the British 
financial group interested in the matter.2t*
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The B rit ish  government, Grey explained, had no in tention of 
prejudicing any rights or obligations which existed between the United 
States and the Chinese government; but, insofar as the B rit ish  
financiers were concerned, i t  was c lear th a t they were e n t it le d  to act 
independently and, indeed, could not be expected, a f te r  what they had 
done to in v ite  American bankers to p a rt ic ip a te  in the loan, to do 
otherw ise.25 Washington was asked by a l l  four governments not to press 
i ts  claims a t so la te  a date but to be s a t is f ie d  with future  
cooperation with the three banking groups.26
Nevertheless, the State Department was determined to get a 
share in the Hukuang loan for American business in te re s ts . The 
department f e l t  that the B rit is h  had no r ig h t  in th e ir  memorandum to 
imply that the United States had relinquished i ts  r ig h t  to p artic ip a te  
in the Hankow-Szechuan pro ject. The department fu r th e r  maintained 
tha t the United States never had withdrawn o f f i c i a l l y  from the Szechuan 
project and tha t the American rights rested upon China's assurances.
The so-called assurances from China were nothing more than an 
ambiquous reply that B rit is h  and American, financia l groups would be 
consulted in case foreign cap ita l was needed fo r  the construction of  
the Hankow-Szechuan ra i lw a y .27
Chargd Fletcher admitted p r iv a te ly  that the Conger 
correspondence was none too favorable to the American cause; but, the 
Chinese recognized the Conger assurances as v a l id ,  thus permitting  
Fletcher to go on pleading Washington's case .28 To ju s t i f y  i ts  claims, 
the American government invoked the Open Door Policy to achieve i ts
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end. The State Department instructed i ts  ambassador in London to state  
to the Foreign O ffice  that
the Government of the United States regards full and frank 
cooperation as best calculated to maintain the open door and the 
integrity of China [and that] the formation of a powerful American,
2 9British, French and German financial group would further the end.
China was not against American p artic ipa tion  in p r in c ip le .  I f  
the Americans had made th e ir  claims e a r l ie r  in the negotiations, the 
Imperial Government would no doubt have admitted them into the 
enterprise. Viceroy Chang Chih-tung informed Fletcher that i f  American 
c a p ita l is ts  had come forward during the negotiations he would have had 
no objections to allowing them to p a r t ic ip a te ,  but he thought the 
matter now had gone too fa r  to be reopened. Viceroy Chang assured 
Fletcher tha t other foreign loans would be needed and that American 
pa rt ic ip a tio n  in them would be welcomed by China-.30 The three foreign  
f inancia l groups also favored American cooperation in future business 
but expressed the opinion tha t i t  was too la te ,  as well as inexpedient, 
to t ry  to delay the f in a l  signature o f the present agreement which was 
reached a f te r  much d i f f i c u l t y .  Representatives of the three European 
groups, according to F letcher, probably would use every e f fo r t  to have 
the Imperial ed ict issued a t  once.31
Despite assurances made by the Chinese government and the three 
groups that American bankers would be welcomed in future loan 
opportunities, the State Department had made up i ts  mind to share in 
the present loan. In his instruction  to Fletcher, Secretary Knox 
blamed the Chinese fo r  not duly notify ing  the United States of i ts  
in tention to f lo a t  a loan for the Hankow-Szechuan railway. The 
American government, Secretary Knox asserted,
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holds that the fact that negotiations have gone so far and that the
representatives at Peking of the foreign groups would have it now
considered too late to try to delay final signature of the present
agreement does not in any wise absolve China from her plain
3 2responsibility to us.
Knox fu r th e r  stated that the present assurance that American capita l 
would be granted p a rt ic ip a tio n  in future loans could scarcely be 
considered a quid pro quo s u f f ic ie n t  to warrant a waiver of present 
undoubted r igh ts . China's fa i lu r e  to meet the ju s t  claim of the United 
States would be, p r a c t ic a l ly ,  to evade a solemn obligation and show an 
unfortunate lack o f appreciation fo r  the consideration which the United 
States Government had so long shown the Chinese government and which 
would not be compatible with China's, repeated professions o f friendship  
and good w i l l . 33 Knox announced that an American banking group now 
was
prepared immediately to enter on such negotiations with the Britishr 
French, and German financiers when the Chinese Government has 
fulfilled its clear duty by informing the representatives of the 
groups with whom this loan has been tentatively negotiated that3American capitalists must be admitted.
Throughout June and July , Washington kept a f te r  Peking while a t  
the same time try ing  to persuade the three European banking groups to 
admit American c a p ita l is ts  into the loan through d ire c t  contacts with 
th e ir  governments. Under pressure from the American government, the 
Chinese government decided not to res is t  fu rther  the American claim 
to a share of the loan. Viceroy Chang Chih-tung n o tif ie d  the American 
legation through the Chinese Foreign Office that he was w i l l in g  to 
allow American p art ic ip a tio n  in the present loan i f  the three European 
banking groups would agree but that he did not wish to take the 
i n i t i a t i v e  in persuading the European bankers on behalf of'American
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in te r e s ts .35 Secretary Knox directed Ambassador WhiteTaw Reid in London 
to point out to the B rit is h  government the menace to foreign trade  
l i k e ly  to ensue from the lack of proper sympathy between the powers 
most interested in the preservation of the p r in c ip le  o f equality  of 
commercial opportunity, and to add that American p a rt ic ip a tio n  in the 
enterprise would strengthen the open-door and the in te g r i ty  of the 
Chinese em pire.36
Under instructions from the State Department, Ambassador David 
J. H i l l  presented the American case to the German government. H i l l  
stressed that because some governments had used great pressure to 
obtain economic advantages in China fo r th e ir  nationals , i t  could not 
be to other nations a matter of ind ifference i f  th e ir  c it izens  fa i le d  
to receive due consideration— especia lly  when that had been s p e c if ic a l ly  
promised.37 H i l l  asserted th a t ,  in his opinion, the American government 
was the leas t aggressive of any of the great powers in demanding, from 
the orien ta l countries, special priv ileges  o f any kind, never having 
asked fo r  anything but an open door and a f a i r  f ie ld .
On the other hand, H i l l  did not think that the American 
government would find  i t  possible to neglect the in terests  of American 
capita l and enterprise in the Far East by passing over in silence the 
e ffo r ts  o f other governments to secure special favors fo r  th e ir  
nationals to the exclusion of Americans. He expressed a wish that the 
German government would understand the position o f the United S ta te s .38 
Sim ilar American presentations were made to the French government.39
In the 6 June Agreement with the European powers, the Chinese 
government pledged general l i k in  and provincial revenues as security
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for  the lo a n .1+0 Since the United States, by a trea ty  with China in 
1903, had promised to support China in securing an increase in the 
customs t a r i f f  in order that l i k in  might be ab o lished ,*1 the American 
government found another excuse to force i ts  way into the Hukuang loan. 
Fletcher warned the Chinese that th is  v i ta l  provision in the agreement 
could produce serious p o l i t ic a l  consequences. In case China fa i le d  to 
f u l f i l l  i ts  trea ty  obligations or execute i ts  payments according to the 
loan agreement, the provincial revenues and general l i k in  of Hupeh 
and Hunan would be controlled by the Europeans.
Fletcher noted that because the loan was to be secured on 
provincial revenues, i t  was important that the United States should 
p artic ip a te  in the enterprise in order that the American government 
would be in a position to exercise an influence equal to that of the 
other three powers in any question that should a r is e , and to enable 
the United States, at the proper time, to again support China in her 
endeavor in securing the abo lit io n  o f  l i k in  and the increase of the 
customs t a r i f f . * 2 Fletcher emphasized th a t ,  in view of the constant, 
unwavering friendship which the United States had shown toward China, 
the Chinese government should be the f i r s t  to desire the salutary  
influence of d irec t American in te re s t in th is  great investment.*3
To make things easier for the European in terests  to accept 
American p a r t ic ip a t io n , the Americans proposed to extend the 
Hankow-Szechuan l in e  to Chengtu so that American bankers could get an 
equal share in the lo an .**  The 6 June Agreement covered only the 
Hupeh section of the Hankow-Szechuan l in e .  I f  the l in e  could be 
extended to Chengtu, the loan controversy could be se ttled  without
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much d i f f i c u l t y ;  however, Chinese autho rit ies  were opposed to the 
proposal. Viceroy Chang Chig-tung explained to Fletcher that the 
American proposal to include the e n t ire  Hankow-Szechuan l in e  was 
impracticable a t the present time because the people o f Szechuan were 
opposed to employment of foreign capita l and were ra is ing funds from 
local sources fo r  the construction of the Szechuan portion o f the l in e .  
Later, i t  might be possible to employ foreign capita l in the 
construction of the Szechuan portion; a t  the moment, the natives o f  
tha t province were convinced that they were able to finance i t . 45
At the insistence of the State Department, the three European 
groups agreed to accept American p art ic ip a tio n  in p r in c ip le .1*6 Yet 
the inclusion of American capita l in the loan was not without 
re s tr ic t io n s . The B rit ish  Foreign O ffice  e x p l ic i t ly  expressed i ts  
hope that the United States should not use the opportunity to place 
obstacles in the way of the issue of an Imperial ed ict approving the 
agreement fo r  the construction o f the Hukuang railways which already  
had been signed.1*7 The Imperial German Government, in equally  
e x p l ic i t  terms, expressed i ts  wish that American bankers should neither  
delay nor e ssen tia lly  modify the existing agreement with the Chinese 
government, and should make i ts  conditions as l ig h t  as possib le .1*8 
Seeing that the European powers had decided to include American bankers 
in the en terprise , Chang Chih-tung promised to delay memorializing fo r  
an Imperial ed ic t to r a t i f y  the loan agreement u n ti l  time had been given 
fo r  American financiers to reach an understanding with the European 
bankers. l*9
The inclusion o f American capita l in the Hukuang loan apparently  
was an American success. I t  was too e a r ly ,  however, fo r  the Americans 
to congratulate themselves on th is  diplomatic v ic tory . New problems 
arose as soon as the four banking groups entered into serious 
negotiations concerning the share of the loan and specific  rights to 
the construction o f the Hukuan railways.
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Chapter 3
RIVALRY AMONG THE FOUR POWERS
Having made considerable progress toward American p art ic ip a tio n  
in the Hukuang loan, Washington turned next to New York to search for  
s u f f ic ie n t  financia l in terests  to carry out the government's economic 
program in China. An American group of New York bankers was h a s tily  
organized to p a rt ic ip a te  in the enterprise. Members of the group who 
signed the a r t ic le s  o f organization on 11 June 1909 were J. P. Morgan 
and Company, the National City Bank, Kuhn, Loeb and Company, the F irs t  
National Bank, and Edward Henry Harriman. Washington's in v ita t io n  to 
the bankers did not promise any immediate reward. I t  stressed the 
p a tr io t ic  resp ons ib ili ty  o f preserving the China market as an o u tle t  
fo r  the products o f American in d u s try .1
In the case of American p art ic ip a tio n  in the Hukuang loan, 
from the s ta r t  the in i t i a t i v e  came from the State Department. Although 
i t  is a usual practice to see private  business in terests  pu lling  the legs 
of the American government, try ing to influence i ts  policy to meet 
th e ir  needs, i t  is unusual to see the American government taking the 
i n i t i a t i v e  in promoting private  business enterprise abroad. During 
T a ft 's  adm inistration, this role was reversed. The Statement 
Department had, in e f fe c t ,  proposed to a group of American financiers  
the d e s ir a b i l i ty  of business investments in China as a matter of 
American national policy and asked them to form an American banking
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group to carry out th is  policy in China. The group included three or 
four of the most powerful f inancia l groups in the United States and was 
used as a sem ioffic ia l instrument by the American government,2 which 
now was p o s it iv e ly  interested in promoting American influence in China 
by means of American investment. The American government under Taft  
had formulated th is  new China policy and began to support i t  with a l l  
the diplomatic resources of the State Department.
According to the terms of the 6 June Agreement, the B rit is h  and 
the Germans enjoyed greater rights in regard to ch ie f engineers and 
auditors than the French, who partic ipated  only in the financing of the 
project and had equal preference in regard to furnishing m aterials fo r  
the ra i lw a y s .3 Mr. F letcher, unable to provide sa tis fac to ry  answers to 
inquiries  from representatives o f the European groups in Peking as to 
how fa r  the United States would desire to change the present agreement, 
sent a telegram to the State Department asking i f  the American group 
would be content to p a rt ic ip a te  in the loan on the same footing as the 
French group, and how much of the loan i t  would be s a t is f ie d  w i th .4
In his reply to the inquiry from the American legation in 
Peking, Secretary KnOx informed Mr. Fletcher that the American group 
was w i l l in g  to p a rt ic ip a te  in the loan on the French basis, i . e . ,  25 
percent o f the to ta l loan on terms identical with those o f the French, 
having equal preference with the French, B r i t is h ,  and the Germans in 
regard to a l l  f in an c ia l re la tions  as well as to m a te r ia ls .5 Because 
the B r i t is h ,  French, and German groups had so nearly reached the 
conclusion of th e ir  negotiations p r io r  to the formation o f the American 
syndicate, Knox stated , the American group would not in s is t  upon rights
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in regard to ch ief engineers and auditors. Mr. Fletcher was directed to 
inform the three European governments, through th e ir  legations in Peking, 
that in*taking th is  position the American group was influenced by i ts  
desire to establish harmonious re la tions  with the B r i t is h ,  French, and 
German bankers in order to secure cordial cooperation in future  
enterprises, and tha t the American action in waiving what might be 
claimed to be i ts  ju s t  r ig h t  should not be regarded as creating a 
precedent as to the basis fo r  future p artic ipa tion  in foreign financia l 
operations in the Chinese Empire. Knox authorized Fletcher to sign the 
agreement on behalf of the American group in case the three other foreign  
groups were ready to accept American p artic ipa tion  on the basis stated  
above.6
The European groups did not want to give the American group an 
equal share in the en tire  loan because the United States had made i ts  
claim a t the la s t  minute and had disturbed the e n tire  proceedings of 
the enterprise. The German group proposed that American capita l cover 
one fourth of the Hupeh section of the Hankow-Szechuan l in e ,  provided 
the American group did not p a rt ic ip a te  in supplying chief engineers and 
m a te r ia ls .7 The B rit is h  and French groups responded favorably to the 
German proposal. J o in t ly ,  the three banking groups informed Prince 
Ch'ing that they had agreed to assign one quarter of the Hupeh section 
of the Hankow-Szechuan l in e  as the American share, and that they would 
not accept the American claim of a 25 percent share of the en tire  lo an .8
The Chinese government was most anxious to have the loan 
concluded, fearing that any fu rth er  delay might in ten s ify  provincial 
opposition to the Imperial Government's policy of employing foreign
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capita l fo r  the construction of China's railways. Liang Tun-yen, 
President o f the Board of Foreign A f fa i rs ,  informed Fletcher that the 
Chinese government would wait un ti l the American group had se ttled  i ts  
differences with the European groups. He expressed a hope, however, 
that the differences could be speedily adjusted and that the United 
States would accept the European o f fe r  and not in s is t  on an equal 
r ig h t  to furnish m a te r ia ls .9
The American State Department refused to consider the o f fe r  
made by the three European groups. I t  insisted that the American 
group should receive one fourth o f the e n t ire  Hukuang loan, 
including the Hupeh-Hunan section of the Hankow-Canton l in e  and the 
Hupeh section o f the Hankow-Szechuan l i n e . 10 The insistence of the 
Americans on a 25 percent share offended the representatives of the 
three groups; they refused to make any concession to accommodate the 
Americans. The loan negotiations were adjourned i n d i f i n i t e l y . 11
Representatives o f the American group negotiating with the 
European bankers were practical businessmen who viewed the loan 
negotiation not as the State Department but through considerations 
of th e ir  business in teres ts . Holding up the proceedings of the 
loan negotiations by in s is ting  on an absolutely equal share in the 
enterprise did not make sense to the American bankers. They 
disapproved of the stubborn position of the State Department and .. 
proposed to make some necessary concessions to keep the whole thing 
going. On 7 July 1909, representatives of the American group 
communicated to the State Department a prelim inary basis of American 
p a r t ic ip a t io n , proposing to break the deadlock by expressing the
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willingness of the American group to p a rt ic ip a te  on a basis less than 
25 percent of the lo a n .12
The new basis proposed by the American bankers was about 20 
percent of the en tire  loan, only s l ig h t ly  revised from the orig inal 
American request.13 The American government declined to accept the 
proposal on the ground th a t any concession would in ju re  America's 
in te re s ts , as well as i ts  honor and prestige, in the Far East. In the 
opinion o f the State Department, i t  was not a matter of 20 or 25 
percent but p r in c ip le . The p r in c ip le  involved was equal opportunity.
To preserve an open door in China and maintain the pr in c ip le  of equal 
commercial opportunity, the United States, declared the State 
Department, would on no account accept less than equal p artic ipa tion  
in the lo a n .1 **
Acting Secretary Huntington Wilson claimed th a t ,  according to 
the assurances made to M in ister Conger by the Imperial Government, the 
American r ig h t  assured in the whole railway system then contemplated 
was vastly  more than equivalent to 25 percent of a l l  that was d e f in i te ly  
involved in the present ten ta t iv e  agreement o f the European bankers.
He also pointed out that th is  ten ta t iv e  loan agreement, in the absence 
of an Imperial sanction, amounted to l i t t l e  more than an application ,  
which, as the Chinese goverment had stated, conferred no r ig h t  to 
anyone. Therefore, there was room to renegotiate and revise the 
agreement to admit American bankers on equal footing with the European 
bankers.15
Wilson warned the American group tha t the American government 
would not recede from i ts  position and that i f  the American group,
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which had undertaken to sustain the American policy of equal 
p a r t ic ip a t io n , ignored the national aspect o f the transaction or fa i le d  
to cooperate in the broad purpose in view, the government would seek 
other instrum enta lities  to secure proper American recognition. Wilson 
wanted the American group to c le a r ly  understand that the American 
government was interested in the loan purely fo r  broad national reasons, 
and tha t the government held such rights as equal pa rt ic ip a tio n  fo r  the 
good of general American in te re s t  in China.16
The position o f the State Department s tiffen ed  reaction from the 
European groups and the Chinese government. The European bankers 
pressed Viceroy Chang Chih-tung and the Chinese Foreign Office to r a t i f y  
the o rig ina l 6 June Agreement on the ground that American bankers had 
been offered reasonable p art ic ip a tio n  and had re fused .17 The Chinese 
Foreign O ffice  warned the Americans th a t ,  although the o f f ic e  had 
promised to wait u n ti l  the American group se ttled  with the European 
bankers, the matter could not be delayed in d e f in i te ly .  I t  urged a 
speedy settlement of th e ir  d if fe re n c e s .18 On 13 July , when Fletcher  
called  a t  the Chinese Foreign O ff ice , Mr. Liang Tun-yen to ld  Fletcher  
tha t he thought the Americans ought to be s a t is f ie d  with one fourth of  
the loan fo r  the Hupeh section of the Hankow-Szechuan l in e ,  and that he 
considered the American rights to one h a lf  of the loan fo r  the 
Hankow-Szechuan l in e  to be rather vague since the Imperial Government 
never had made any d e f in i te  commitment but promised only to consult 
the Americans in case foreign cap ita l should be needed.19
Fletcher, in emphatic terms, asserted that the American 
government regarded China's assurances as positive  arid unequivocal and
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that China had pledged a one-half share in the e n tire  Hankow-Szechuan 
loan to the United States. He warned Mr. Liang that i f  any action  
should now be taken by China inconsistent with her assurances, i t  would 
have a most deplorable e f fe c t  in the United States. Liang was 
requested not to take any action which would place China in an awkward 
position and seriously a f fe c t  the f r ie n d ly  re la tions  o f the two 
governments. Fletcher f e l t  sure that the European financiers would 
agree to American partic ip a tio n  on the basis’ o f  25 percent when they 
rea lized  that the a tt itu d e  of China and the United States was firm' 
on th is  p o in t .20
Meanwhile, Viceroy Chang Chih-tung, who was d ire c t ly  involved 
in the loan negotiations, was impatient with the delay. He wanted 
to go ahead and wind up the present loan as i t  stood.21 On 14 July, 
Prince Ch'ing communicated a long dispatch from Chang Chih-tung to 
the American government through Fletcher. In his dispatch to the 
Chinese Foreign O ffice , Chang pointed out that America, in entering  
into the discussion, at such a la te  hour, was the cause of delay and 
that even i f  the three banking groups were w i l l in g  to come to an 
understanding with the American group and make an equal divis ion of 
the loan, the agreement already was signed and could not be changed.22
The Viceroy was p a r t ic u la r ly  resentfu l when he learned that the 
Americans declined the o f fe r  of a one-quarter share of the loan for the 
Hupeh section of the Hankow-Szechuan railway and demanded another one 
quarter o f the loan fo r  the Hupeh-Hunan section of the Hankow-Canton 
l in e  to make up the to ta l o f 25 percent in the en tire  loan. He made a 
strong statement in regard to the American claim:
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With regard to the Canton-Hankow Railway I learned that
formerly, because the American-China Development Co. secretly sold
two-thirds of the capital shares to the Belgian, thus breaking the
agreement, a loan was sanctioned by the throne of £1,100,000 to
redeem to China all interest in this railway. It is unreasonable
now once more to borrow American capital to construct this railway.
Moreoever, there has been no record since the 31st year of Kuanghsu,
the 12th moon (December, 1905), when China had redeemed the Canton-
Hankow Railway, that that line has authorized the borrowing of any
American capital. Why does America now, without any pretext, still
desire to lend funds for the purposes of this railway? Most
emphatically, no such course can be considered. At the mere mention
of it the literati and people of the three Privinces would rise up
in protest against it as absolutely out of the question; unfavorable
criticism would rise up like a flood. I, also, would be most
unwilling, after this railway has been redeemed from the Americans,
2 3to again borrow American capital for its construction.
In communicating Chang's dispatch to the American government, Prince 
Ch'ing expressed the hope of the Chinese government that "stringent 
orders" would be sent to the American group to come to an immediate 
agreement with the European groups so that the desire of China to 
fo s te r  the fr ie n d ly  re la tions  between the two countries would not be 
disappointed.2h
Chang Chih-tung1s resentment was not without i t s  reasons.
The in ternal position of the Chinese government has grown stead ily  
worse as a resu lt  of the wrangling among the powers and the delay of 
the conclusion of the agreement concerning the Hukuang railways. Due 
to growing opposition to the Imperial Government's railway policy in 
the Hukuang provinces, the government could not afford  much time playing 
diplomatic games with the powers. Yet th is  did not seem to hasten 
a compromise among the powers. As soon as one group or government 
seemed ready to end the deadlock, another power renewed i t  with fu rther
demands.
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The picture o f these foreign banking groups and governments 
clashing fo r  th e ir  s e lf ish  economic in terests  in China was not one to 
encourage the Chinese hope in foreign cooperation or Peking's 
re liance on provincial support. Throughout the country, antipathy  
toward foreigners and provincial opposition to the Imperial Government's 
railway policy hastened the Chinese government's e f fo r t  to have the 
Hukuang loan agreement concluded as early as possible. At the same 
time, i t  s t iffened  Peking's resistance to the American claim of an 
absolutely equal share in the enterprise. Viceroy Chang's dispatch 
communicated to the American government was somewhat an ultimatum: 
the United States must accept a one-quarter share o f the loan fo r  the 
Hupeh section o f the Hankow-Szechuan l in e  or receive nothing a t  a l l .
The American position was in such danger that on 15 July , 1909, 
President William H. Taft resorted to the. extraordinary procedure of 
taking a personal part in the struggle by cabling vigorously to Prince 
Chun, Regent of the Chinese Empire:
I am disturbed at the reports that there is certain prejudiced 
opposition to your government's arranging for equal participation 
by American capital in the present railway loan. To your wise 
judgment it will of course be clear that the wishes of the United 
States are based, not only upon China's promises of 1903 and 1904, 
confirmed last month, but also upon broad national and impersonal 
principals of equity and good policy in which a regard for the best 
interests of your country has a prominent part. I send this message 
not doubting that your reflection upon the broad phases of this 
subject will at once have results satisfactory to both countries. I 
have caused the legation to give your minister for foreign affairs 
the fullest information on this subject. I have resorted to this 
somewhat unusually direct communication with Your Imperial Highness, 
because of the high: importance that I attach to the successful 
result of our present negotiations. I have an intense personal 
interest in making the use of American capital in the development 
of China an instrument for the promotion of the welfare of China, 
and an increase in her material prosperity without entanglements or 
creating embarrassments affecting the growth of her independent 
' political power and the preservation of her territorial integrity.25
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President T a f t 's  in tervention not only ignored Viceroy Chang 
Chih-tung, who was d ire c t ly  responsible fo r  the railway p ro jec t, but 
bypassed the Chinese Foreign O ffice  as w e ll ,  I t  is unusual that the 
President of the United States should have communicated with the head 
of another government on behalf o f private  business in teres ts .
Obviously, President Taft took th is  drastic  measure in the hope that  
the authority  and prestige of his o f f ic e  would influence the decision 
of the Prince Regent so tha t Chang Chih-tung could be pressured from 
above to wait u n ti l  a compromise was reached between American and 
Euorpean bankers.
In a following telegram, Secretary Knox instructed Mr. Fletcher  
to make sure o f the delivery  and fr ie n d ly  explanation of the President's  
telegram to the Prince Regent. Reinforcing T a ft 's  telegram, Knox 
demanded prompt Chinese acceptance of equal American p art ic ip a tio n  in 
the Hukuang loan and warned the Chinese government th a t ,  i f  the 
reasonable wishes of the American government should be thwarted, the 
whole resp o n s ib il i ty  would rest upon the Chinese government.26 He
informed the Chinese government that there was no reason to doubt th a t ,
■ \ 
as a resu lt  of early  meetings in Paris or B erlin , the American group
soon would reach an agreement with the European bankers fo r  equal
p art ic ip a tio n  in the present loan by American c a p ita l ,  and that i t
would be inconsistent with the d ign ity  and moral r ig h t o f the United
States and with a policy h itherto  fr ie n d ly  on the part of China i f  the
United States were expected fo r  one moment to consider less than equal
p a r t ic ip a t io n .27 Knox emphasized in his telegram th a t ,
This government greatly deplores a situation in which it seems 
that individuals in China or elsewhere are able to defeat the
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practical operations of the policy of the open door and equal
opportunity, and if the objections of bankers of other countries
to equal American participation are so insistent as not to be
overcome by the wishes of China and of their own Governments,
the time has arrived when China should exercise its right to
determine the matter by confining her dealings to those who are
willing to respect her highest interest. . . . Americans would
welcome an opportunity to arrange for the whole loan, if necessary,
by reason of further persistency of the individuals who refuse to
2 8meet the situation broadly.
The individuals to whom Secretary Knox referred  was no doubt 
representatives of the European groups, who had been urging China to 
conclude the agreement as i t  stood without American p a r t ic ip a t io n , and 
Viceroy Chang Chih-tung, who was growing hostile  to the American claim  
and declared that he would wait only a few days more before sending a. 
memorandum to the Throne fo r  Imperial sanction o f the loan agreement 
with the European groups.29
The telegrams of President T a ft  and Secretary Knox achieved 
th e ir  intended resu lts . Confronted by the American determination to 
secure an equal share in the loan, the Prince Regent decided to comply 
with the wishes of the American government. Orders went out from the 
Imperial Palace to include the United States in the loan. The 
ministers of the Chinese Foreign Office were instructed to negotiate  
with the American charge d 'a f fa ire s  in Peking so as to come to a 
suitable  decision and take action accord ing ly .30
Negotiations a t Peking about the Hukuang loan were resumed 
somewhat f i t f u l l y  a f te r  the Prince Regent's cable to President T a f t . 31 
This time, the Americans adopted a. more f le x ib le  a t t i tu d e  to secure 
equal p art ic ip a tio n  and avoid d ire c t  confrontation with the established  
in terests  of the European groups in the loan. Even before the American 
government received a positive  response from the Prince Regent,
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Fletcher t r ie d  to e f fe c t  a way to break the deadlock. On the afternoon 
of 15 July , Fletcher called at the Chinese Foreign Office to suggest 
to Mr. Liang the f e a s ib i l i t y  o f increasing the loan by 12.5 percent and 
admitting equal American p a rt ic ip a tio n  without challenging the 
established in terests  of the other foreign groups.32
Fletcher explained th a t the o r ig ina l o f fe r  made by the 
European bankers was about 12.5 percent of the e n t ire  loan so th a t ,  i f  
the loan were increased by the d if fe re n c e , an agreement should be 
possible. He added th a t ,  from what he had learned, the amount of the 
present loan would be in s u f f ic ie n t  fo r  the construction o f the two 
sections mentioned in the loan agreement. Mr. Liang personally approved
the idea and promised to have i t  presented to Viceroy Chang Chih-tung 
fo r his consideration .33
The State Department approved F letcher's  suggestion and regarded 
such an arrangement as s a t is fac to ry , provided American in terests  enjoyed 
absolutely equal rights in every p a r t ic u la r .  In his telegram to 
Fletcher, Secretary Knox confirmed the department's approval of his 
suggestion and instructed Fletcher to understand tha t "equal rights in 
every p art icu la r"  stated in the department's 16 July telegram included 
a l l  r ights with regard to m ateria ls , engineers, auditors, and any other 
benefits which would na tu ra lly  accompany a 25 percent in te re s t  in the 
lo a n .34
With the approval of the State Department, Fletcher presented 
the American proposal to the European groups.35 The proposal was 
c a re fu l ly  discussed between the European bankers and the Chinese 
government. A fte r  an understanding had been reached, Mr. H i lT ie r  of the
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Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation informed Mr. Flether that  
the bankers had agreed to accept the American proposal in p r in c ip le ,  
and that the bankers were about to telegraph to th e ir  principals  to 
inform them of the development and obtain th e ir  approval.36 According 
to the understanding reached between the bankers, the orig inal loan 
of £5,500,000 was to be increased by £500,000 to be a l lo t te d  to the 
Hupeh section of the Hankow-Szechuan l in e  and, by an arrangement of the 
the European bankers, the American group would finance £1,500,000 of the 
loan thus re v ise d .37 By this arrangement, American financiers would 
be ensured 25 percent o f the e n tire  loan without disturbing the European 
in terests .
Mr. H i l l i e r  wanted the Americans to understand that no other 
conditions of the loan agreement should be changed in any respect. He 
stated that more money would be required in the future for the 
construction o f the Hankow-Canton l in e  and, because the United States 
had no legal claim whatsoever on the Hankow-Canton l in e ,  the American 
group should be content with one h a lf  of any sum which would be needed 
in the future for the completion of the Hankow-Szechuan l i n e . 38 
Fletcher related to Mr. H i l le r  Secretary Knox's instruction that the 
American government would not re tre a t  from the position that American 
partic ipa tion  in the present loan, revised as proposed, should be equal 
in every p a rt ic u la r  to th a t of other groups. Mr. H i l l i e r  remarked 
that American bankers now were claiming more than they had claimed 
before. He promised to confer again with his fe llow  bankers and to 
communicate the new American position to th e ir  principals in Europe.39
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The European bankers and the Chinese government seemed to 
attach great importance to reaching a settlement on the basis o f the 
o rig ina l 6 June Agreement, a lte red  only as to the amount o f the loan. 
Chang Chih-tung openly stated that he did not wish to use any American 
money on the Hankow-Canton l in e  and the European bankers had 
endeavored to have American p art ic ip a tio n  in the Hukuang loan lim ited  
in a l l  respects to the Hankow-Szechuan l i n e . 1*0 Fletcher did not think  
the matter was a serious problem; he offered no objection to having the
increased amount of £500,000 a l lo t te d  to the Hankow-Szechuan l in e .  He
advised the State Department to comply with the l im ita t io n  set by the 
European bankers and the Chinese government, but he demanded that  
American p a rt ic ip a tio n  in the present and future benefits o f the 
agreement absolutely must be equal and ju s t  as i f  American bankers 
were a party to the orig ina l agreement.1*1
American insistence on equal rights in every p a r t ic u la r  again 
blocked the way to an early  conclusion o f the loan. Pressed by the 
in ternal s itu a t io n , the Chinese government was anxious to have the 
loan concluded. Liang Tun-yen, President of the Board of Foreign
A ffa ire s ,  appealed to M in ister R ockhill, who was on leave in
Washington, to help solve the problem. Liang asked Rockhill to 
inform President Taft o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f the Chinese government 
so that the matter could be s e ttled  at an early  d a te .1*2 In his 
telegram to R ockhill , Liang informed him that the Chinese government 
already had agreed to increase the loan by £500,000, and that in  
arranging fo r  the pa rt ic ip a tio n  of the United States in the loan to 
be f lo a te d , the Chinese government had done i ts  best to accede to
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the wishes o f the American government. The p r in c ip le  of America's 
p art ic ip a tio n  in the loan on an equal basis in every p a r t ic u la r ,  in 
Liang's opinion, was not of great importance. I t  would only cause 
fu rther  delay and prevent the negotiations from being successfully
concluded. Liang pointed out that the United States had put forth
i ts  claims a t  a la te  hour and that the Chinese government was w i l l in g
to admit American bankers into the loan and do whatever was possible
to g ra t i fy  the wishes o f the American government only because the 
Chinese government wished to maintain harmonious re la tions  with the 
United States. Liang hoped that the American government would 
understand China's d i f f i c u l t i e s  and give up i ts  claim fo r  absolutely  
equal p a rt ic ip a tio n  so that an agreement could be reached.1+3
Despite the appeal o f the Chinese government fo r  an early  
conclusion of the loan, the o f f ic ia l  proposal o f the American 
government made to the European groups made few concessions on the 
basis o f American p a r t ic ip a t io n . The American government insisted  
that American bankers take one fourth o f  the loan and, in the same 
proportions, have and enjoy a l l  the r ig h ts , powers, p r iv ileg es , and 
discretions granted to and vested in the English, German, and French 
bankers under the terms on the 6 June Agreement concluded between the 
European bankers and the Chinese government. Americans and American 
goods, products, and materials should be e n t it le d  to the same priv ileges  
and preferences reserved in the agreement to B r i t is h ,  German, and 
French nationals and m ateria ls . Besides, the American government 
proposed that a board of engineers be set up fo r  each of the two 
railways: th a t the chairman of each board be the ch ie f engineer;
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that an American engineer, to be approved by American bankers, should 
be a member o f each board; that the chairman of the Hupeh-Hunan section 
be English; that the chairman o f the Hupeh section o f the Hankow- 
Szechuan l in e  be German; that an American ch ie f engineer should be 
chosen fo r  the next section of the Hankow-Szechuan l in e  constructed by 
foreign c a p ita l;  and that American bankers were to have th e ir  
proportionate representation in the purchasing agencies fo r  the 
railways to be constructed and th e ir  proportionate share of a l l  
advantages therein .
The proposal o f  the American government was not received 
favorably by the Chinese government and the European groups. The 
Chinese authorit ies  refused to accept the part of the American 
proposal which re lated to the appointment o f an American ch ie f engineer 
fo r  the Szechuan section of the Hankow-Szechuan l in e .  Mr. Liang 
Tun-yen p r iv a te ly  informed Fletcher that any reference to the Szechuan 
extension a t  th is  time would evoke a storm o f c r it ic is m  from the 
people o f Szechuan.**5 The European bankers said that they had no 
authority  to accept the American proposal fo r  the creation of a board 
of engineers. To do so would necessitate a change in the present 
loan agreement, which they did not believe Chang Chih-tung or th e ir  
principals  in Europe would accept. Mr. Liang was of the same opinion.
I t  also was thought that the creation of such a board would give r ise  
to many d i f f i c u l t i e s  in practice. Fletcher then asked i f  the bankers 
would object to the appointment of American engineers in subordinate 
capacities. The European bankers rep lied  that they would have no
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objections in th is  respect and promised that such appointments would 
be made.1*6
When the question of materials was ra ised , the European bankers 
proposed that American p a rt ic ip a tio n  in th is  respect be lim ited  to 
one h a lf  the preferred m aterials on the Hankow-Szechuan l in e .  Fletcher  
pointed out the im p ra c t ic a b il i ty  o f the proposition and insisted that  
American materials should p a rt ic ip a te  equally on both lines as enjoyed 
by B r i t is h ,  French, and German m ateria ls . F letcher's  position was 
supported by Mr. Liang. F in a l ly ,  the European representatives agreed 
to le t  the Americans have equal rights in furnishing materials fo r  both 
l ines . The understanding reached was incorporated in the a lte rn a t iv e  
proposal.1*7
As to future loans, the European bankers made i t  c lear that  
they did not wish to le t  American business in terests  have anything to 
do with the Hankow-Canton l in e ,  no matter how much money would la te r  be 
needed fo r  the completion of the l in e .  They would, on the other hand, 
c le a r ly  recognize the American r ig h t  to furnish one h a lf  of any foreign  
capital borrowed by China fo r  the completion of the Hankow-Szechuan 
l i n e . 1*8 A fter the fiasco o f  the American China Development Company, 
American p a rt ic ip a tio n  in any loan fo r the Hankow-Canton railway would 
encounter serious opposition from the Chinese au tho rit ies  who t r ie d  to 
avoid local opposition as much as possible. Besides, American 
partic ip a tio n  in the present loan was based on assurances which had 
reference sole ly  to the Hankow-Szechuan l in e .  In view of these fa c ts ,  
Fletcher agreed to accept the European term s.1*9
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The representatives o f the three European groups raised  
the question of additional security  in connection with the 
increase of the loan to £6,000,000. Mr. Liang considered tha t the 
security  pledged by the Chinese government was s u f f ic ie n t .  A fte r  a 
short discussion, the bankers waived the question because i t  was 
evident that they could not in s is t  on a change in the agreement in  
th is  respect while res isting  a l l  other a lte ra t io n s . Further 
discussion of the de ta ils  of the interbank agreement was postponed 
u n ti l  a d e f in ite  reply had been received from the American State 
Department and the European bankers' principals  on the a lte rn a t iv e  
proposal. 50
In the endeavor to secure equal American p a rt ic ip a tio n  in the 
Hukuang loan, Mr. Fletcher was more f le x ib le  than the American State 
Department. In his telegram to Secretary Knox, Fletcher expressed his 
opinion that he did not believe that much practical advantage could be 
gained from insistence upon a provision fo r  subordinate engineers. He 
urged the State Department to adopt a more conc ilia to ry  a tt itu d e  to 
help conclude the lo a n .51 Under the promptings of F letcher, the State 
Department authorized him to inform the Chinese government that the 
American government would consent to the arrangement as to ch ie f  
engineers as set out in A r t ic le  17 o f the 6 June 1909 Agreement, 
provided the Chinese government would assure the employment of American 
engineers by the managing d irectors . The deparment made i t  c le a r ,  
however, that the American government did not waive equal rights in 
regard to m aterials in a l l  lines and branches covered by the c o n tra c t .52
New problems arose as soon as the old ones were solved. On '
27 August, Mr. Fletcher received new instructions from the State  
Department. Two points were emphasized. F i r s t ,  the United States 
Government insisted upon an amendment to give the American group an 
equal voice in the purchasing agencies. Second, Mr. Fletcher was 
instructed to urge a single agreement including "a ll a lte ra tions  and 
amendments now involved in the substance of the supplementary and 
amendatory points now accepted by a l l  parties or herein fu rther  
suggested." Secretary Knox explained that the orig ina l agreement had 
been essentia lly  changed because of the American p a rt ic ip a tio n ;  
therefore , the American government saw no reason fo r  is o la t in g , in a 
supplementary agreement, changes e n t ire ly  germane to the change in 
amount as well as to a l l  other provisions of the orig ina l agreement.53
On 19 August 1909, Mr. W illard S tra ig h t, representative of the 
American group, arrived in Peking. A conference was held the next day. 
Present were representatives o f the four foreign banking groups and 
the Chinese government. The European bankers had prepared a d ra f t  of  
an agreement embodying the points on which a common understanding seemed 
to have been reached. This d ra ft  agreement was discussed a r t ic le  by 
a r t ic le .  No objection was raised to the arrangement of engineering 
rights and the furnishing of materials fo r  the ra ilw a y s .51*
In regard to the purchasing agencies, Stra ight and Fletcher 
endeavored to secure a provision that one o f  the agencies should be 
nominated by the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and the American group and the 
other by the English and French groups. This American proposal was not 
accepted. No changes were made in the orig ina l agreement, provided
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that the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank would act as the purchasing agent fo r  
the Hankow-Szechuan l in e  and a company nominated by the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation fo r  the Hankow-Canton Tine. The 
arrangement did not give the American group as much voice in the 
purchases as would be desired in order to see that American materials  
received due consideration, but i t  was agreed that a l l  commissions 
would be pooled and the American group would receive 25 percent o f the 
to ta l commissions.55
The American insistence on a single agreement caused objections  
from the European groups and Chang Chih-tung. Fletcher reported to 
the State Department that the Peking agent of the German group was 
taking advantage of the American position to inform the Chinese 
government that "the Americans do not re a l ly  want to part ic ip a te  in the 
loan, but desire to defeat any loan a t a l l . "  The German agent pointed 
out that the Americans "no sooner receive concession in regard to one 
point" then they raised new ones.56
Chang Chih-tung, who was very i l l ,  wanted to have the loan 
concluded while he s t i l l  could make decisions. He strongly opposed any 
changes of the orig inal agreement except as to the amount of the loan, 
but he was w i l l in g  to sign a supplementary agreement providing for  
American p a r t ic ip a tio n . Mr. Fletcher believed i t  would not be " p o li t ic  
or expedient to in s is t  further"  on American inclusion in the o rig ina l  
agreement because "Chang has set himself against any fu rther  change in 
that p a r t ic u la r  agreement." Rather than risk  a c r is is  and consequent 
anti-American recrim inations, Fletcher reported to the State Department,
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he had decided to accept the less simple solution and withdraw the 
proposal fo r a single agreement.57
As a resu lt  o f the r iv a l  in te re s ts , the Chinese were becoming 
"restive" and were "complaining" about the American action. Fletcher 
expressed his fear of "the e f fe c t  on future American enterprises o f  
s im ila r  nature i f  too obdurate a position is taken on th is  matter o f  
the form of the agreement." , He recommended i ts  solution "as soon as 
p o ss ib le ."58 The State Department accepted F letcher's  reasoning and 
raised no fu rth er  questions as to the form of the agreement. A fter  a l l ,  
the United States could gain nothing by in s is ting  on a single  
agreement. I t  merely was a matter o f the American group being included 
in the orig ina l contract which might be re lated to American prestige  
as a power second to no other European power. The compromise on the 
part o f the Americans did not bring the dispute to an end. The 
engineering rights of the Hankow-Szechuan lin e  soon became another 
major point o f dispute.
★ *  *
A B rit is h  proposal came on 8 September 1909 to. solve the 
present loan dispute by d iv id in g , as equally as was practicab le , the 
engineering figh ts  of the whole Hankow-Szechuan l in e  from Hankow to 
Chengtu among the four powers. This new proposal covered the Szechuan 
section of the Hankow-Szechuan l in e  from Ichang to Chengtu which was 
not included in the o rig ina l 6 June Agreement. I f  the Chinese 
government should "object to the making of any d e f in ite  arrangement 
at present fo r  the construction of the Szechuan l in e  beyond the Hupeh 
section," the B rit ish  proposed, the Chinese government should promise
la te r  to "apply to the four powers fo r  the capita l required" fo r the 
extension. The B rit ish  government appealed that each European group 
should make some s a c r if ic e  so as to allow the p art ic ip a tio n  of the 
American group.59
The aim of the B rit ish  proposal was prim arily  not to accommodate 
the Americans but to c u r t a i l ,  i f  not e n t ire ly  e lim inate , the German 
in terests  in the Yangtze railway loans. The B rit is h  always had been 
opposed to the extension of German influence into the Yangtze River 
V a lley --the  B rit is h  sphere of in te re s t .  B r it is h  and German capita l 
had fought fo r  the r ig h t  to construct the Hankow-Canton l in e .  The 
Germans obtained the concession only because they had offered more 
l ib e ra l  terms to the Chinese than the B rit ish  offered . Although a 
compromise f in a l ly  was reached by the tran s fe r  o f German in terests  
in the Hankow-Canton lin e  to the Hankow-Szechuan l in e ,  with the 
19G9 signing of the Hukuang 6 June Agreement, the B rit ish  fa i le d  to 
keep the Germans away from th e ir  sphere of in te r e s t .60
The e n t ire  Hankow-Szechuan lin e  was about 2,400 kilometers in 
length of which the Hupeh section from Hankow to Ichang was 800 
kilometers and the Szechuan section was 1,600 kilometers. According 
to the intergroup agreement of the three powers before the 6 June 
Agreement with the Chinese government, the Germans were to engineer 
the 800 kilometers of the Hupeh section and the B rit is h  and French 
in terests  were to share the 1,600 kilometers of the Szechuan 
s e c tio n .61 To s a t is fy  the Americna claim to appoint an engineer on 
one h a lf  of the Szechuan section, the B r it is h  proposed th a t ,  in s t r i c t  
equity , the Germans should surrender 267 kilometers of the Hupeh
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section and the Anglo-French in terests  surrender 533 kilometers of the 
Szechuan s e c t io n .62
Well aware o f  the intentions of the B r i t is h ,  the Germans 
protested th a t ,  since the Chinese government never had granted 
permission to extend the lin e  into Szechuan, the B rit is h  and French 
in terests  would make no s a c r if ic e  a t a l l  and German bankers alone 
would s a c r if ic e  th e ir  r ig h t to engineer the e n tire  Hupeh section. 
According to the views of the German f in an c ie rs , i t  would only be 
f a i r  th a t ,  should the Hankow-Szechuan l in e  be divided into four, the 
Hankow-Canton l in e  also should be d iv id e d .63 The B rit ish  refused to 
consider any suggestion tha t the Hankow-Canton l in e  be divided into  
four. I t  appeared to the B rit ish  government that under the arrangement 
proposed by the Germans, the B rit is h  group would be making a double 
sacrif ice --o n e  on the Hankow-Szechuan l in e  and one on the Canton-Hankow 
l ine -^w hile  the Germans would be compensated fo r  th e ir  s a c r if ic e  on the 
Hankow-Szechuan l in e  by what they gained at B rit is h  expense On the 
Canton-Hankow l in e ,  which would be no s a c r if ic e  a t  a l l . 64
During September 1909, with Viceroy Chang Chih-tung's death 
now an early  p o s s ib i l i ty ,  feverish e f fo r ts  were made to reach an 
agreement in the Hukuang loan dispute which already was three and 
one-half months old. The German group appealed to London to aid in 
securing an agreement, leaving de ta ils  fo r  the fu tu re . The Peking 
agents of the four groups did reach an agreement on 24 September; the 
American State Department promptly approved i t  the next day .65 
Fletcher n o tif ie d  the Chinese Foreign Office that the American bankers 
were ready to close and that they would not bear the resp o n s ib il i ty  for
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fu rther delay in the signature o f the agreement.66 The agreement o f  
the banking groups was, however, again delayed, th is  time by the action  
of the B rit is h  government which requested tha t the B rit is h  
representatives delay signing the agreement, in s is ting  on i ts  proposal 
of dividing the. engineering rights of the Hankow-Szechuan l i n e . 67
On 4 October 1909, Viceroy Chang Chih-tung died in Peking, 
leaving the Hukuang loan negotiations deadlocked.68 The B rit ish  
government's "embargo" on signing a compromise agreement remained 
e f fe c t iv e .  The death o f Chang Chih-tung gave the B rit is h  government 
"an opportunity of reconsidering the whole Yangtze railway loan 
question and of undertaking the negotiations de novo. " 69
The e n tire  matter of the railways in the Hukuang provinces had 
been in the hands of Chang Chih-tung. The B rit is h  and German rights  
in the Hukuang railways rested la rge ly  on the assurances of Chang 
Chih-tung which had never received the d e f in i te  approval and sanction 
o f the Imperial Government. In a time o f emergency, however, the 
B rit is h  Hong Kong government had advanced £1,100,000 to the Chinese 
government fo r  the redemption of the Hankow-Canton Railway loan from 
the American China Development Company.70 To express his g ra titu d e ,
* V
Chang Chih-tung, on 9 September 1905, via a le t t e r  to the B rit is h  
consul a t  Hankow, Mr. E. H. Fraser, had given assurances to accept 
B rit is h  financia l aid i f  foreign cap ita l were required again to build  
the Hankow-Canton ra i lw a y .71 The B rit ish  therefore seemed to have a 
moral claim on the Chinese government which would be impossible to 
evade.
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The change o f a t t itu d e  on the part o f the B rit ish  government was 
due, in F le tcher’ s opinion, la rge ly  to the influence o f  Mr. Valentine  
Chirol who c r i t ic iz e d  in the Times the action o f his government fo r  
surrendering to the Germans and fo r  fa i l in g  to cooperate with American 
in te re s ts .72 There was a strong in c lin a t io n  in certa in  in f lu e n t ia l  
B rit is h  quarters to t ry  to c u r ta i l  and gradually elim inate German 
in terests  in the Yangtze River V a l le y .73 Viceroy Chang Chih-tung's 
death was seized upon as a favorable opportunity to e f fe c t  such a 
change. The B rit ish  government intended to support an absolutely equal 
American p a rt ic ip a tio n  in the Hankow-Szechuan l in e  in every respect as 
an e f fe c t iv e  means of decreasing German financia l in terests  in the 
Yangtze region--the B rit ish  sphere o f in f lu e n c e .74
The American legation in Peking, annoyed by the B rit ish  
government's la s t  minute change of a t t i tu d e ,  had no intention of  
siding with the B rit ish  in th e ir  u n ila te ra l action to build up th e ir  
strength in the Yangtze River Valley. The course the B rit ish  were 
about to take, Fletcher understood very w e ll ,  would lead to a sharp 
c o n f l ic t  between German and B rit ish  in terests  and, i f  the Germans 
were forced out o f the Yangtze region, they ce rta in ly  would in s is t  
upon compensation via loans in Shangtung and elsewhere, thus the 
• "sphere of influence" policy would be revived in another form.
Fletcher therefore advised the State Department that conclusion of 
the present agreement o r , b e tte r ,  an agreement frankly  providing fo r  
the equal treatment of a l l  parties "is fa r  preferable to a reopening 
of the whole question, when special local rights and interests  
w il l  be insisted upon." He urged the State Department to send strong
58
representations to pressure the B rit ish  government fo r an early  
settlement of the Hukuang lo an .75
The American State Department was in f u l l  agreement with 
Fletcher's  analysis o f the s itu a t io n . Acting Secretary o f State  
Huntington Wilson instructed Ambassador Whitelaw Reid to inform the 
B rit ish  government that the United States Government "would be 
constrained to feel keen disappointment" i f  the Government o f  Great 
B rita in  should continue to disregard the agreement reached by the 
four banking groups and cause fu rther delay in the conclusion o f the 
Hukuang lo a n .76
Viceroy Chang Chih-Tung's death also created substantial 
d i f f i c u l t ie s  for the Chinese Imperial Government. People in the 
Hukuang provinces long had been opposed to the borrowing of foreign  
capita l to build China's railways. Nevertheless, during the l i fe t im e  
of Chang Chih-tung th is  opposition would have amounted to l i t t l e  more 
than ta lk  because, having so long been viceroy o f the Hukuang 
provinces, his influence and prestige had been s u f f ic ie n t  to overcome 
the opposition of the local gentry. The Imperial Government had, fo r  ' 
a long time, re l ie d  on Chang Chih-tung to pacify the Hukuang provinces. 
The death of Chang Chi-tung removed the one man from public l i f e  who 
might have been able to prevent a b i t te r  clash between Peking and these 
provinces in which the slogan o f "no foreign financia l co n tro l" had 
been employed widely as an e ffe c t iv e  weapon with which to attack the 
central government.
Delay in finding a quick solution fo r  the Hukuang loan gave 
provincial anti foreign and anti railway c e n tra l iza t io n  forces a chance
59
to s t i r  up feelings against foreign influence and against the authority  
of the Imperial Government. Although the Imperial Government well knew 
that the provincial gentry were f in a n c ia l ly  incapable o f undertaking the 
construction of these ra ilways, and had no in tention of allowing the 
opposition forces to in te r fe re  with the consummation of th is  important 
enterprise, i t  was Woefully weak and might, now tha t Chang Chih-tung's 
influence in the Yangtze region was withdrawn, hesitate  to adopt the 
strong lin e  with these provinces.
Representatives of the four groups recognized the danger of 
delay and t r ie d ,  accordingly, to break the deadlock. The B rit is h  
government denied that i ts  action had delayed the negotiations. 
Nevertheless, seeing tha t there was no way to c u r ta i l  German in terests  
without support from the United States, the B rit is h  agreed to back 
down. A new proposal was made in which the Germans were requested to 
surrender only the Hsiangyang-Kuangshui section, estimated a t  200 
kilometers, as a contribution of some 600 kilometers imposed upon the 
Anglo-French in terests  by the American claim to one h a lf  of the 
Ichang-Chengtu extension.77
Fletcher was encouraged by th is  sign of compromise and proposed 
to the Germans on 26 October that an American engineer be appointed 
for the Hsiangyang-Kuangshui section of 200 kilometers to cooperate 
with and be subject to general d irection of the German ch ie f engineer.78 
The American proposal was accepted by the German Foreign Office and 
the German bankers were authorized to sign the agreement with the 
Chinese at once.79 Since the American proposal was substan tia lly  in 
harmony with the con c il ia to ry  proposal offered by the B r i t is h ,  the
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B rit ish  government decided to comply with the wishes of the American 
and German governments for an early settlement. An understanding was 
reached between the American, B r i t is h ,  and German in te r e s ts .80
By the new arrangement, the en tire  Hankow-Szechuan l in e  would 
be divided among the powers as follows: f i r s t  section, 500 kilometers,
French ch ie f engineer; second section, 600 kilometers, American chief  
engineer; and th ird  section, 500 kilometers, English ch ie f engineer.
The Germans were to re ta in  the en tire  800 kilometers of the Hupeh 
section, provided that the 200 kilometers from fisiangyang to Kuangshui 
be constructed under an American engineer subordinate to the German 
chief engineer, and that the American engineer fo r the Hsiangyang-
Kuangshui section should not in te r fe re  with judgment o f the German
ch ie f engineer regarding the purchase of m a te r ia ls .81
French in terests  had not been consulted during the entire
proceeding o f the arrangement. Now that the three groups were ready 
to sign the f in a l agreement with the Chinese government, the French 
government regarded the arrangement as unsatisfactory and raised 
objections to the divis ion o f engineering rights of the Ichang-Chengtu 
extension.82 The three governments urged the French government to 
in struct i ts  bank representatives to sign the orig ina l and supplementary 
agreements as they stood, leaving the d e ta ils  of possible future  
extension to be se ttled  la te r  by private  arrangement.83 Secretary 
Knox warned the French government th a t ,  in view of the increasing 
opposition in China's provinces, the United States government believed 
i t  would be fo r  a l l  concerned a misfortune of the most far-reaching  
consequence i f  the French government fa i le d  now to in struct i ts
61
bankers to complete the arrangement without fu rth er  d e la y .84 Yet the 
French government refused to comply. I t  declared that as soon as i t  
obtained, in the Hankow-Canton and Hankow-Szechuan l in e s ,  a share equal 
to the share o f other powers, i t  would be ready to sign the loan 
agreement.85
The French government pointed out that the projected Hukuang 
railways comprised about 3,200 kilometers, 800 fo r  each p a r t ic ip a n t,  
and that the American and German groups each had received i ts  leg itim ate  
share, which represented a quarter o f the en terprise , whereas the 
B rit is h  reserved 1,400 kilometers, 900 on the Hankow-Canton l in e  and 
500 on the Hankow-Chengtu l in e ,  proposing to the French to be content 
with an eventual 500 kilometers on the Szechuan l in e .  The French 
government thus regarded the proposed divis ion of engineering rights  
as unacceptable to France. As soon as the French group was ensured a 
share equal to that o f i ts  partners, the French government expounded, 
there would be no fu rth er  opposition. Should i t  be otherwise, the 
French government was determined not to s ig n .86
To hasten the conclusion o f the Hukuang loan, the B rit is h  
Foreign O ffice  instructed representatives of the B rit ish  group to 
s a c r if ic e  in favor o f  the French demand fo r  additional mileage so that  
the French and German sections could be equal in le n g th .87 According 
to the information received by the American State Department, France 
would withdraw i ts  objection to the signing of the Hukuang loan 
agreement i f  the French group received engineering rights on an 
additional 100 kilometers o f the Chengtu extension.88 Secretary Knox 
instructed that i f  th is  report was well founded, the United States
Government was w i l l in g  to "share equally with Great B rita in  in making 
such sacrif ices  of engineering rights" on condition that the orig ina l  
and supplementary agreements were signed without fu rth er  delay. The 
Secretary also wished to make i t  c lear that the surrender by the United 
States of such engineering priv ileges  should not be mistaken as a 
compromise on i ts  other rights insofar as the Hukuang loan was 
concerned.89
The B rit is h  intended to make no s a c r if ic e  a t  a l l . On 3 January 
1910, the B rit ish  Foreign M in ister F. A. Campbell made a new proposal 
to divide the e n t ire  Hankow-Szechuan l in e  into four equal engineering 
sections. Each group was to receive 600 k ilo m eters .90 France and 
Germany raised no objections to the B rit is h  proposal.91 By the new 
B rit ish  proposal, the French were to gain 100 kilometers of engineering 
r ig h ts , thus putting them on an equal footing with the three other 
groups. German in terests  were not affected because th e ir  ch ie f engineer 
s t i l l  would have the e n tire  800 kilometers of the Hupeh section under 
his supervision. The B r it is h  also gained 100 kilometers on the Szechuan 
Tine so tha t th e ir  engineering rights would be increased to the to ta l  
of 1,500 kilometers on both lines . The American group was to be the 
only loser in the new arrangement. The American share in the Chengtu 
extension was to be reduced from 600 to 400 kilometers and, according 
to the agreement between the American and German in te re s ts , the American 
group could provide only a subengineer fo r  the section from Hsiangyang 
to Kuangshui. The actual mileage under the American ch ie f engineer 
therefore would be 400 kilometers. Secretary Knox declared that the 
B rit ish  proposal was "en t ire ly  unacceptable" to the American government
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because i t  would cancel the agreement already reached between the 
United States and Germany which Great B rita in  had approved.92
Since the death o f Chang Chih-tung, no progress in the Hukuang 
loan negotiations were made a t Peking. The American State Department 
had learned through newspapers and from commercial houses tha t the 
Szechuanese already had begun construction of the l in e  from Ichang to 
Wanhsien, a section o f the Szechuan T in e ,93 which suggested that the 
provincial au tho rit ies  s t i l l  were try ing  to build the l in e  through 
th e ir  e f fo r ts  despite the na tio n a liza t io n  program of the Imperial 
Government. The American State Department, in i ts  negotiations with  
the other powers concerned, held i t  to be unwise to imperil the 
success of the present loan fo r  the sake of an agreement as to 
engineering rights upon a l in e  fo r  the financing of which a concession 
might never be obta ined.94
The French government informed the B rit ish  government that the 
divis ion o f the Hankow-Szechuan l in e  was "not unacceptable" to the 
French government which provided that the p r in c ip le  of equality  
between the French and B rit is h  groups be extended to the Hankow-Canton 
l in e  by the appointment of a French subengineer.95 The American State 
Department s t i l l  insisted on i t s  proposal tha t the American group 
y ie ld  in favor of the French group 100 kilometers of engineering rights  
on the Szechuan extension provided that the B rit ish  should s a t is fy  the 
French group's desire to have a French subengineer on the Hankow-Canton 
l in e .  I t  urged the acceptance of the American proposal as the "most 
feas ib le  and e q u ita b le .1,96 The American proposal was received favorably  
by the French government because i t  could gain more from the American
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proposal than from the B r i t is h .  The proposal also appeared acceptable 
to the German in te r e s ts .97
The fundamental d ifference in the position assumed by Great 
B ri ta in ,  and that o f the other three powers, was tha t while the la t t e r  
regarded engineering rights on the Hankow-Canton l in e  as an in tegral 
part o f  the Hukuang loan arrangement, Great B rita in  insisted upon 
trea ting  that section as separate and reserved to h erse lf . To r e s t r ic t  
th is  p r in c ip le  o f d ivis ion into four equal parts to the Szechuan lin e  
alone, as proposed by the B r i t is h ,  seemed unjust to the American State 
Department. The department fa i le d  to follow the reasoning by which 
the B rit is h  group contended that the Canton-Hankow l in e ,  while included 
as an in tegra l part of the Hukuang agreement in respect to financing, 
supply o f m ateria ls , and a l l  other important respects, was excluded 
from the scope of the agreement in engineering rights a lo n e .98 
Ambassador Reid, in his note to the B rit ish  Foreign O ff ice , emphasized 
th a t the Hankow-Canton l in e ,  being an in tegral part of the Hukuang 
agreement, should be considered in connection with the equal division  
of engineering rights among the four groups.99
The B rit ish  government was strongly against the appointment of 
a French subengineer to the Hankow-Canton l in e .  I t  stated that neither  
the American nor the French group could reasonably claim engineering 
rights on the Hankow-Canton l in e  because, by the 19 May 1909 arrangement 
made between the B r i t is h ,  French, and German groups, the ch ie f engineer 
Of th is  l in e  was c le a r ly  specified to be B rit is h  and because the 
American government, being a latecomer in the f i e l d ,  had agreed to 
waive i ts  rights as to ch ie f engineers and reserve them only on 
future extensions.100
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The B rit ish  government admitted that the Hankow-Canton lin e  
undoubtedly formed an in tegral part o f the e n tire  loan agreement. 
Nevertheless, B rit ish  o f f ic ia ls  claimed, B rit ish  financia l interests  
were e n t it le d  to a priv ileged position insofar as the Hankow-Canton 
section was concerned because B rit ish  financia l in terests  alone had 
advanced the funds required to enable China to redeem the concession 
of th is  l in e  from the orig ina l American holders and, thus, obtained 
the preference to this l in e  from the Chinese government in case 
foreign capita l should again be required fo r  the construction of this  
l in e .  Moreover, the B rit ish  Foreign Office pointed out, the preference 
claimed by the B rit ish  now was confined to a mere question of  
engineering r ig h ts , absolute equality  as finance and materials were 
regarded having already been conceded.101
In his l e t t e r  to Reid, the B rit ish  Foreign M in ister told the 
American ambassador that he was aware that the Germans had given the 
American group only 200 kilometers of subengineering r ig h ts . The 
200 kilometers, however, were part of a l in e  already conceded by 
China and, therefore , were more valuable than a concession of an 
extension which was "merely problematical." To show that i t  was not 
the B rit ish  government's in tent to sa tis fy  i ts  se lf is h  in te re s ts , the 
B rit ish  Foreign M in ister offered to change sections with the American 
group i f  American bankers were not s a t is f ie d  with the arrangement.
The minister expressed his earnest hope that the American government 
should accept the B rit ish  government's viewpoint. He asserted that 
American consent to the B rit is h  proposal would greatly  f a c i l i t a t e
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an agreement between the four groups which, in view of recent events 
in the Yangtze region, was "da ily  becoming more u rgen t."102
Seeing that i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  to pressure the B rit ish  
government to change i ts  position , and that fu rther delay could 
a f fe c t  the conclusion of the en tire  loan agreement, the American 
government withdrew i ts  objections and decided to accept the B rit ish  
proposal. Ambassador Reid, under instructions from the State Department, 
informed the B rit ish  government th a t ,  while s t i l l  dissenting from the 
p rin c ip le  o f equal d iv is ion o f  the Hankow-Szechuan l in e ,  the United 
States Government was disposed to accept 400 kilometers of ch ie f  
engineering rights on the extension to Chengtu and 200 kilometers of 
subengineering rights with Germany on the Hupeh section, provided 
that such acceptance would close the neg o tia tio n s .103 The B rit ish  
government expressed pleasure with the decision reached by the 
United S ta te s .101*
The conc il ia to ry  a t t i tu d e  o f the United States la rge ly  was 
prec ip ita ted  by the in ternal s itua tio n  of the Chinese Empire. Two 
ch ie f factors were enough to worry the Imperial Government: . increasing 
domestic outcries against po lic ies  o f the Imperial Government and 
growing im p e r ia lis t  r iv a lr y  w ith in  the empire. The Manchu government 
could find  no trustworthy aid to discourage domestic discontent or to 
remove the danger o f  foreign domination. Chang Chih-tung was dead, 
the Hukuang loan was in cold storage awaiting agreement among the 
powers who were contending for a bigger share fo r  th e ir  business 
in te re s ts , and provincial c r it ic is m  was increasing.
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I f  Peking urged haste in concluding railway loans such as the 
Hukuang loan of 6 June 1909, nothing but long, drawn-out negotiations  
ensued between the r iv a l  powers. I f  Peking favored one foreign  
government or group, opposition was bound to develop at home or 
abroad. What would China's fa te  be as a result? Judging from past 
experiences, the im p e r ia lis t  powers would t ry  to strengthen but not 
abandon th e ir  priv ileged positions in China. Even the United States 
was jo in ing  the European powers in the f ig h t  fo r  concessions and 
priv ileges in China. From the active role played by the Americans 
in the Hukuang loan dispute, the Chinese government discovered a 
new force competing with the established European interests in search 
of concessions in China.
The Hukuang negotiations were complicated by the action of  
the Szechuanese who had taken the Szechuan extension into th e ir  hands 
and had started construction. I f  provincial enterprise should build  
a l in e  from Ichang westward toward Wanhsien, as reported ,105 
the four banking groups would not be able to include th is  extension 
in th e ir  proposed agreement with Peking. On the other hand, i f  the 
powers were to in s is t  on the inclusion of the Chengtu extension in 
the agreement, the Chinese government would be placed in a quandry: 
i t  would be obliged to incur greater provincial h o s t i l i t y  by supporting 
foreign demands or to refuse the inclusion, thereby antagonizing the 
four powers capable o f lending the much needed funds for China's 
development and reforms. I t  would be a d i f f i c u l t  choice for the 
Imperial Government. The Szechuanese plan to^build a railway without 
the assistance of Peking or foreign loans was but a sample of the 
ag ita tio n  spreading through China at that t im e .106 I t  was no easy
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matter fo r  the government to persuade the provincial gentry to accept 
i ts  railway concentration program.
By the end of January 1910, the Chinese government, under the 
guidance of the young Prince Regent, was facing impending crises. 
Provincial l ib e ra ls  demanded more p o l i t ic a l  r ights  and quicker reforms. 
The reform problems in turn reinforced a constantly increasing 
struggle between the Imperial Government and provincial a u th o r i t ie s .107 
What made matters worse, these reforms implied a foreign democratic 
influence in China, weakening rather than strengthening an already  
crumbling Imperial administration a t a time when actual authority  was 
greatly  needed to sustain the central au thority .
The railway loans embittered Peking's re la tions  with the 
provinces which opposed national control as well as foreign funds and 
supervision. With the Hukuang loan in a s tate  of deadlock, the four 
foreign banking groups s t i l l  were competing fo r advantages with to ta l  
disregard fo r  any e f fe c t  on Chinese opinion. The prestige of the Ch'ing 
government and i ts  adm inistrative in te g r i ty  had been seriously impaired 
by im p e r ia l is t  r iv a l r ie s  in the empire. With the provinces demanding 
more freedom from the Throne, with the powers in s is ting  on Peking's 
approval o f th e ir  r iv a l  claims, and with no outstanding leader v is ib le  
in China to guide the young Prince Regent through the crises , the 
beginning of a new year did not bring much hope and joy to the empire, 
but seemed to an tic ip a te  a year f u l l  o f trouble , more ominous than the 
year that had ju s t  passed.
Conflicts among the powers injured the prestige of the Chinese 
Imperial Government and posed a potentia l threat to the adm inistrative  
in te g r i ty  of China. Popular sentiment turned even more against the
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Manchu authorit ies  who were blamed, on the one hand, fo r  y ie ld in g  to 
foreign pressure and, on the other, fo r  not granting enough rights to 
the provinces. Rioting and destruction o f foreign property in 
Changsha, capita l of Hunan province, in c id en ta lly  exemplified a 
growing provincial h o s t i l i t y  to the Peking government and foreign  
a c t iv i t ie s  in China.108 The Prince Regent had reason to fear foreign  
complications in the Yangtze region and sent orders "to take a l l  
precautions against fu rth er  troubles, as the people in Hunan province 
are turbulent and pugnacious.1,109 An Imperial ed ict dealing with 
the Changsha s itua tio n  was issued on 21 April a t Peking.110 Yet the 
next day, "serious disturbances" a ffec ting  missions in Hunan, the 
destruction of business houses a t  Changsha, the evacuation of  
foreigners, and the a r r iv a l ,  of foreign warships at Changsha were 
rep o rted .111
International r iv a lr y  in connection with Chinese railway loans 
and China's in ternal unrest led the Prince Regent's government to feel 
resentful and to threaten c a ll in g  o f f  a l l  pending negotiations. So 
apprehensive was the Peking government over the protracted delay in 
concluding the Hukuang loan negotiations and over popular opposition, 
especia lly  in Szechuan, to foreign loans and c o n tro l, that W illard  
S tra ig h t, representative o f the American group, cabled J. P. Morgan and 
Company that China wanted to drop the whole business.112 Yet the 
divis ion  of engineering rights on the Szechuan l in e  seemed to be a 
stumbling block to the foreign banking groups who quarreled over the 
size o f th e ir  respective shares of the l in e .
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The compromise made by the American government to accept the 
B ritish  proposal helped to bring the exhausting intergroup negotiations 
concerning the Hukuang loan to a conclusion. Menaced by the imminent 
danger of losing the en tire  enterprise, the four foreign groups f in a l ly  
compromised th e ir  differences at Paris and prepared to present an 
identic  note to the Chinese government demanding Imperial sanction 
of the orig inal and i ts  supplementary agreements, as approved by the 
four foreign groups and th e ir  governments.113 A quadruple agreement 
was signed a t Paris on 23 May 1910 by representatives o f the B r i t is h ,  
French, German, and American banking groups and, as a re s u lt ,  a 
four-power Consortium was formed.111*
Peking's objection to the inclusion o f the Szechuan extension
*
in the contract seemed to carry l i t t l e  weight a t the negotiations of 
the foreign powers. The extension was included in the intergroup 
agreement, and bankers of the four groups were determined to secure that 
extension from the Chinese government despite ominous rumblings in the 
two Hukuang provinces and especia lly  in Szechuan against using any 
foreign capita l for  China's ra i lw ay s .115
The agreement of 23 May 1910 provided fo r  a £6,000,000 loan to 
be shared with any supplementary loan to be issued in connection with 
the Hukuang railways equally among the four groups. All orders for  
materials were to be divided equally among the four groups. In regard 
to the long-disputed engineering r ig h ts , i t  was agreed that the chief  
engineer for the Hankow-Canton l in e  was to be appointed by the B rit ish  
and that a German ch ie f engineer should be provided for the Hupeh 
section o f the Hankow-Szechuan l in e ,  a length o f about 800 kilometers.
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The German group, however, was to appoint an American subengineer for  
about 200 kilometers o f the Hupeh section from Hsiangyang to Kuangshui. 
In regard to the proposed extension o f the Hankow-Szechuan l in e  from 
Ichang to Chentu, a to ta l length of about 1,600 kilometers, the ch ie f  
engineer o f the f i r s t  400 kilometers was to be American, a B rit ish  
ch ie f engineer fo r  the next 600 kilometers, and a French ch ie f  
engineer fo r  the remaining 600 kilometers of the l i n e . 116
The four groups also accepted a new B rit ish  proposal before 
signing the intergroup agreement whereby i t  was agreed that i f  the 
Szechuan extension should prove to be less than 1,600 kilometers in 
length, the engineering r ights  of each group would be reduced 
proportionately; i f  the extension should prove to be over 1,600 
kilometers and under 2,200 kilometers, the engineering r ights  would 
be proportioned equally among the American, B r i t is h ,  and French 
groups; and i f  the extension should exceed 2,200 kilometers, the 
appointment of ch ie f engineers of the surplus over 2,200 kilometers 
should be divided equally , as nearly as possible, among the four 
groups.117
With the conclusion o f the intergroup agreement, the long, 
drawn-out loan dispute among the four groups f in a l ly  was brought to 
a temporary truce. Now the task of the four groups and th e ir  
governments was to concert th e ir  e f fo r ts  in pressing the Chinese 
government fo r  r a t i f ic a t io n  o f the o rig ina l and supplementary agreements 
endorsed by the foreign bankers.
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Chapter 4
CONCLUSION OF THE LOAN AND AMERICAN 
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CONSORTIUM
Between 23 May and the end of June 1910, the governments of 
the United States, Great B r i ta in ,  France, and Germany had given th e ir  
o f f ic ia l  approval to the intergroup agreement.1 On 13 July, an 
identic  note was presented to the Chinese Foreign Office by the 
English, German, French, and American legations notify ing the Chinese 
Foreign Office of th e ir  governments' acceptance of the intergroup 
agreement and urging an Imperial sanction of the 6 June Agreement 
and i ts  supplementary agreement without delay. This was claimed to be 
"in accordance with the expressed wishes of the Chinese Government."2 
The B rit ish  and American governments, in supplementary notes on the 
same date, reminded the Chinese government o f  the 1903 and 1904 
promises in regard to the Hankow-Szechuan l i n e . 3
A fter the death of Chang Chih-tung, the Hukuang loan 
negotiations had been turned over to the Board of Posts and 
Communications fo r  a settlement with the foreign banking groups.k 
The Chinese Foreign Office informed the foreign bankers of th is change 
and negotiations resumed between presidents of this board and the 
foreign bankers early  in October 1910; The Chinese representatives  
n o tif ie d  the foreign bankers that China was not ready to close the 
negotiations on the exact terms presented by the four banking groups 
because the agreement had been worked out exclusively among the
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bankers without consulting the Chinese authorit ies  concerned. They 
argued tha t the orig inal agreement of 6 June 1909 could not be taken as 
f in a l  but as a d ra ft  open to m odification. The basis fo r  th is  argument 
was that the 6 June Agreement had been in i t ia le d  only. I t  had recieved 
neither the approval o f  the Board of Finance nor the sanction of the 
Throne. Further negotiations were necessary because "the state of 
popular feelings was such in Hunan and Hupeh that the agreement in i ts  
present form could not be concluded without risking serious local 
troub le ."  I t  therefore was necessary to modify some of the 
objectionable term s.5
Representatives o f  the banking groups believed that the 
presidents o f the board exaggerated the danger o f local trouble in order 
to obtain easier conditions, tha t China should be able to carry out the 
orig ina l terms without r isking serious disturbances, and that she 
should be pressed to do so by the four governments. I f ,  however, th e ir  
governments were not inclined to take th is  view, the bankers suggested 
that th e ir  legations in v ite  the Chinese government to state  the desired 
modifications in order to find  a mutual basis fo r  understanding, at the 
same time upholding the in v io la b i l i t y  o f the in i t ia le d  agreement. In 
the opinion of the foreign bankers, the v a l id i ty  of the in i t ia le d  
agreement had to be maintained. Should i t  be otherwise, the 
negotiations would not rest on solid  ground.6
M in ister W. J. Calhoun, Rockhill 's  successor in Peking, 
concluded in his telegram to the Secretary of State th a t ,  because the 
present complications and delay had been a ttr ib u ted  to the action of  
the United States in demanding i ts  partic ip a tio n  the year before, the
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State Department should continue i ts  policy of concerted action with 
the other three powers even i f  i t  did not seem that a contractual value 
could properly be attached to the in i t ia le d  agreement.7
The State Department was more cautious than M in ister Calhoun.
On 7 October, Acting Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee informed Mr. 
Calhoun that the steadfast policy o f the department had been to demand 
a ju s t  share in any contemplated loan fo r  a Hankow-Szechuan railway but 
not to force a loan on China. Mr. Calhoun was instructed to avoid 
taking the lead in pressing China to r a t i f y  the in i t ia le d  and 
supplementary agreements but to continue to act in concert with the 
other Consortium governments to bring about ah amicable and early  
adjustment o f  the m a tte r .8 This co n c il ia to ry  a t t i tu d e  to the Chinese 
government was fu r th e r  stressed a few days la te r  when Washington 
approved a Chinese request fo r  “local settlement" a t  Hankow of the 
Changsha r io t  c la im s .9
The news of the quadruple agreement gave r ise  to a storm of  
protest among the gentry and in te l l ig e n ts ia  of the affected provinces 
who always had objected to the Imperial Government's supervision of 
the projected Hukuang railways and Peking's in tention to use foreign  
funds fo r  the construction of the en tire  system. Trouble already had 
occurred even two months before the intergroup agreement was signed.
The Changsha r io t  was a major incident in the general unrest in the 
Hukuang provinces and Szechuan; indeed, those troubles carried the 
potentia l fo r  a major an tifo re ign  crusade.
The general unrest in Szechuan, Hunan, and Hupeh over the 
Hukuang loan delayed the negotiations between the Chinese government
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and the four Consortium banking groups fo r  several more months. The 
issue between these provinces and the Imperial Government was the 
control o f the Hukuang railways. The Imperial Government decided not 
to make any fu rth er  compromise to provincial ag ita tion  because i t  
would fu rth e r  weaken the authority  of the Imperial Government and 
to ta l ly  destroy i ts  prestige and c r e d ib i l i ty .  Besides, no compromise 
on the part of the Imperial Government a t th is  stage could quench the 
h o s t i l i t y  of the provincials whose aim now was the termination of 
Manchu ru le .
Government p o lic ie s , whatever th e ir  nature, were bound to 
encounter strong opposition from the provinces. The policy most l ik e ly  
to give the to tte r in g  regime a chance to survive was to strengthen
i ts  authority  by firm-handed action. In am Imperial ed ict o f May 1911,
the Throne reasserted i ts  determination to nationa lize  a l l  the 
nation's major railways:
The Government must have, in all directions extending to the 
borders of the empire, great trunk lines in order to carry on 
government effectively, and to maintain centralized authority. 
Hitherto the methods have been ill-conceived, and there has been 
no fixed plan, with the result that the railway administration of the 
whole country has fallen into confusion. There has been no 
distinction between trunk and branch lines and no estimate of the 
powers of the people. Requests on paper to act hastily have been 
granted. Commercial railway enterprises have been carried on for 
many years. In Kuangtung shares have been withdrawn, and only a 
small Section of railway has been built. In Szechuan there has
been misappropriation of funds and fruitless attempts to recover.
In Hunan and Hupeh offices have been opened for many years, capital 
has been vainly wasted to the exhaustion of the people's resources.
If this period of waste continues longer, the burdens of the people 
will be the heavier and both Government and people will suffer 
injury. How can we contemplate the consequences of such mistakes?
We now clearly proclaim to the whole Empire that the trunk railway 
lines are to belong to the Government. 10
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The Imperial Government's decision to continue i ts  policy o f railway  
concentration and employment o f foreign capita l la te r  proved to be a 
contributing cause to the rapid spread of the revolution a f te r  the 
Wuchang outbreak in the f a l l  of 1911.
The new Chinese National Assembly, convoked in the f a l l  of 1910 
as part o f the p o l i t ic a l  reform, was e n t it le d  to pass a l l  government 
loans. The assembly represented the sentiment o f the Hukuang 
provinces and Szechuan being opposed to the Hukuang loan which, the 
assembly members understood, would strengthen the Peking government a t  
the expense of local a u th o rit ie s . Sheng Hsuan-huai, M in ister of 
Communications who now was in charge of the Hukuang loan negotiations, 
therefore avoided the assembly and confined his dealings exclusively  
with the four-power Consortium on the ground that he was completing 
an obligation entered into p r io r  to the National Assembly's existence. 
The government's disrespect for th is  newly created national le g is la t iv e  
body in ten s if ie d  the tension between the central government and the 
provincials and quickened the process toward a showdown in a 
revolutionary outbreak.11
With "conditions of unrest prevalent throughout the Yangtze 
b as in ,"12 the Consortium powers continued to increase th e ir  pressure 
on China for the sanction of th e ir  recent agreement on the loan. Their 
request fo r  "imperial sanction o f the aforesaid agreements" about the 
Hukuang loan "to be d e f in i te ly  signed and put into operation fo r  the 
benefit of the commercial development o f China and of her foreign  
re la t io n s "13 e n t ire ly  ignored China's in ternal problems and changes 
since June 1909 when Chang Chih-tung was a l iv e .
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In an e f fo r t  to persuade Peking to accept the intergroup 
agreement, Secretary Knox explained to China's Special Envoy Liang 
Tun-yen that "the aim of American p o licy ,"  in the negotiations to 
secure American p art ic ip a tio n  in the Hukuang loan and other enterprises  
in China, had been "to secure a sympathetic and practical cooperation 
of the great powers in maintaining the p o l i t ic a l  in te g r i ty  o f China by 
making i t  to the in te re s t o f  each to support such a p o licy ."  He also 
t r ie d  to convince Liang th a t "where the nations invest th e ir  c a p i ta l , 
there they are in ten t on preserving peace and promoting the development 
of natural resources and the prosperity of the people. "1‘*
When i t  had become more obvious th a t ,  due to provincial 
opposition and unrest, i t  was un like ly  that the Imperial Government 
would r a t i f y  the o rig ina l and supplementary agreements as they stood, 
the Consortium powers agreed to modify th e ir  terms. On 18 March 1911, 
the four Consortium groups met a t Brussels to s e t t le  th e ir  modified 
Hukuang agreements. A settlement f in a l ly  seemed possible and 
fundamentals were approved.15 Meanwhile, Sheng Hsuan-huai was try ing  
to get easier terms from the Consortium. He in s is ted , as la te  as 
29 March, on no fu rther  y ie ld ing  to foreign pressure which might arouse 
a storm of fresh protest. W illard  S tra ig h t, the American representative, 
worked strenuously to convert Sheng, and Sheng evidently realized that  
a firm a tt itu d e  would mean no loan. On 30 March, a f te r  a seven-hour 
conference, Sheng yielded p ra c t ic a l ly  everything to have the loan 
concluded. The foreign bankers were "de lig h ted .1,16
Meanwhile, the p o l i t ic a l  s itua tio n  of the Chinese Empire d a ily  
was growing more dangerous. Rumors o f China's probable p a r t i t io n ,
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protests against Peking's policy of railway concentration and foreign  
loans, and c r it ic is m  of the imperial system under the Manchu rulers  
combined to create a s itua tio n  which made i t  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the Prince 
Regent to approve the pending Hukuang loan contract. On 27 A p r i l ,  a 
v io len t uprising occurred in Canton which added to the gravity  of 
conditions. A leading B rit ish  newspaper a t Shanghai pointed out th a t ,  
while th is  uprising was not an tifo re ign  but bas ica lly  anti-Manchu, i t  
showed that "no small part o f the complaint against the Manchus is the 
humiliations to which they are declared to have exposed China from 
abroad."17 The rebe llion  was suppressed only a f te r  numerous executions, 
leaving south China in a "dangerous state o f m ind."18
Opposition to the government's railway plans aided this  
antidynastic movement. Various public groups such as the provincial 
gentry, the native press, and provincial assemblies were warning Peking 
against the loan. A fter  years o f y ie ld ing  to provincial demands, Peking 
found i t  d i f f i c u l t  abruptly to take a contrary position and to conclude 
a loan which had aroused such popular resentment. The foreign bankers 
could do l i t t l e  but await the decision of the Chinese government.19
A fter  much delay and strenuous negotiations, China f in a l ly  
agreed to sign and r a t i f y  the amended Hukuang loan c o n tra c t .20 The 
f in a l  agreement fo r the Hukuang railways was signed on 20 May 1911, 
and the event was promptly followed by Imperial sanction. The major 
concession made by the Consortium bankers to Chinese sentiment was 
exclusion of railway construction in the Kwuangtung and Szechuan 
provinces. But the Chinese government made a promise that the four 
banking groups would be given f i r s t  p r io r i ty  i f  foreign capita l
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should be required in the future fo r  the construction of railways 
within these two provinces.21
The agreement essentia lly  was s im ila r  to the 6 June 1909 
Agreement supplemented by the intergroup agreement of 23 May 1910.
The f in a l agreement authorized the banks to issue a 5 percent gold 
loan in the amount of £6,000,000. The in te res t and principal o f the 
loan, according to the agreement, was to be paid, i f  possible, from 
the revenues of the Hukuang railways. Should these revenues not be 
s u f f ic ie n t ,  China agreed to make other arrangements for payment of  
in te re s t and p r in c ip a l . I f  fu rther foreign loans should be needed 
fo r  the construction of Hukuang railways, the Consortium groups by 
th is  agreement secured the r ig h t  to issue a supplementary loan, 
not to exceed £4,000,000, on the same terms as the present loan.
Should a greater amount of foreign money be needed, i t  was to be 
providedd by the Consortium groups on terms to be arranged.22
In regard to purchasing agents, the f in a l agreement was 
essen tia lly  the same as the 6 June 1909 Agreement except that the f in a l  
agreement provided that r a i ls  and th e ir  accessories be purchased from 
the Hanyang Iron Works in consideration of promoting China’s domestic 
industries. The divis ion of engineering r ig h ts , over which the 
Consortium members had wrangled fo r  so long, was in the f in a l  
agreement somewhat a ltered from the provisions of the orig inal and i ts  
supplementary agreements because of the changes made during the winter  
of 1911 in the projected lin es . As f in a l ly  provided, China was to 
appoint a B rit is h  ch ie f engineer fo r  the Hupeh-Hunan section of the 
Hankow-Canton l in e  from Wuchang to Yichang, a German ch ie f engineer
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fo r  the Kuangshui-Ichang section of the Hankow-Szechuan l in e ,  and an 
American ch ie f engineer fo r  the section of that l in e  from Ichang to 
Kueichoufu.23
The May 1911 Agreement brought the protracted loan 
negotiations to an end. The chaotic and rap id ly  changing s itua tio n  in 
China did not, however, permit the Imperial Government or the 
Consortium powers to be op tim is tic . The settlement of the Hukuang loan 
was the beginning of greater trouble. I t  was iron ic  that the 
conclusion o f the Hukuang loan should help to p re c ip ita te  the outbreak 
of the Chinese Revolution.
Following the conclusion of the loan came an immediate upsurge 
of domestic c r it ic is m  against the Imperial Government. That th is  loan 
was r a t i f ie d  without constitu tional procedure through submission to 
the Advisory Senate soon was seized upon by c r i t ic s  of the Prince 
Regent. In Szechuan, an active  anti-Peking movement was launched to 
defeat the newly-reasserted railway concentration program. Also, the 
Imperial decision to take over the lines already constructed by the 
provinces of Hunan and Hupeh aroused v io len t outcries against Peking.24
The Imperial Government t r ie d  desperately to ward o f f  d isasters, 
but too many grievances, domestic and in te rn a t io n a l, complicated matters 
thereby preventing a united policy and denying the central government 
time and scope to deal with each problem separately. In the fa r  o f f  
Szechuan province, a provincial railway league convened on 4 August 
1911 and adopted a program completely defying the authority  o f the 
Imperial Government. The provincial newspapers charged the Manchu 
government with "selling Szechuan to the foreigners" and condemned
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Sheng Hsuan-huai as a " t r a i to r  to China." A railway protection  
association was formed by Szechuan pa tr io ts  including many o f the 
prominent businessmen and provincial assembly members. When the 
Viceroy o f Szechuan province took action to suppress the anti-Manchu 
movement, the p a tr io ts ,  by the f i r s t  week in September, took up arms 
and in i t ia te d  an open rebe llion  against the Manchu dynasty.25
The Szechuan rebe llion  soon was followed by the Wuchang 
Uprising o f 10 October 1911. I ts  s p i r i t  inspired a nationwide 
revolution against the Manchu ru le rs . The corrupt regime was e n t ire ly  
incompetent to re s is t  the t id e  of the revo lution. Four months la t e r ,  
on 12 February 1912, the Hsuan-t'ung Emperor formally abdicated the 
monarchy, thus putting an end to the dynastic system which had lasted  
fo r  more than two thousand years in China.26
The outbreak o f the Chinese Revolution brought down the Imperial
Government. With the disappearance of the central au th o rity ,
governmental control of the e n tire  country went a lso , temporarily a t
le a s t .  The chaotic s itua tio n  made any kind o f  railway construction
p ra c t ic a l ly  impossible. Although the authorized loan was issued in
1911, construction did not begin u n ti l  two years la te r .  The four
Consortium groups never f u l ly  carried out th e ir  plan as specified
in the loan agreement with China.27
*  *  *
A fte r  the establishment of the Republic o f  China, the Chinese 
government was confronted with almost insuperable d i f f i c u l t i e s .  I ts  
treasury was empty and i ts  resources were drained. Soldiers were 
underpaid and, in many cases, were without pay a t a l l .  The government 
was desperately in need of money to set i ts  adm inistrative machinery
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in fu l l  motion. In order to improve the s itu a t io n , the only choice fo r  
the government was to resort to foreign loans. In the middle of 
February 1912, China approached representatives of the Consortium 
powers fo r  a large loan to reorganize the Chinese a d m in is tra tio n .28
In response to the Chinese request, the Consortium made two 
advances to the Chinese government to meet i ts  emergency need and, 
at the same time, began negotiations with China fo r a reorganization  
lo a n .29- Meanwhile, the Consortium was enlarged into a six-power 
Consortium through the admission of Russia and Japan.30 At Paris ,  
the banking groups o f the six powers concluded a formal agreement 
fo r equal p art ic ip a tio n  in the loan under discussion. The reorganization  
loan negotiations henceforth began to be almost wholly occupied with 
discussions o f the terms o f supervision or control between China and 
the s ix powers.31
The reorganization loan was d i f fe re n t  from any of the previous 
loans because i t  was not to be used fo r  a d e f in ite  program but fo r  
general adm inistrative purposes. Too much control by foreign creditors  
over the reorganization work of the Chinese government c e rta in ly  would 
lead to infringement upon China*s adm inistrative in te g r i ty .  One of the 
conditions attached to the loan by the Consortium powers c le a r ly  
specified th a t ,  for  a period o f  f iv e  years, China should appoint the 
groups' f in an c ia l agents to assist the administration in i ts  work of  
reorgan iza tio n .32 I t  was natural that the Chinese government found i t  
hard to accept the terms of the Consortium. Strong internal opposition 
made the Peking government shrink from accepting them and, as a re s u lt ,  
the negotiations came to a deadlock.
Because the loan negotiations were being obstructed by the 
powers fo r  p o l i t ic a l  reasons, representatives of the American group, 
impatient with the delay in the conclusion of the loan and finding i t  
impossible to oppose the action of the other members of the Consortium, 
suggested tha t the American group withdraw from the loan ne g o tia t io n s .33 
The American M in is ter in Peking, William J. Calhoun, reported to the 
State Department th a t ,  in his opinion, " i t  is no longer a question of 
f r ie n d ly  in ternationa l cooperation to help China but a combination of 
big powers with common in terests  to accomplish th e ir  own s e lf ish  
p o l i t ic a l  a im s."31* The President and the State Department were opposed 
to American withdrawal from the Consortium on the ground that any 
sudden change of a t t itu d e  on the part of the American group would 
embarrass the government and in jure  American prestige and in terests  in 
China. A fte r  conferring with the President, the American group decided 
not to make any decision on the matter u n ti l  the next administration  
had declared i ts  policy toward the Consortium.35
In the midst of th is  s itu a t io n , a new administration came to 
power in the United States with Woodrow Wilson as President and William  
Jennings Bryan as Secretary of State. Upon inauguration o f the new 
President, the American group immediately asked the State Department i f  
the policy of the new administration toward the in ternational Consortium 
was to be the same as that o f i ts  predecessor. The bankers stated that  
they had partic ipa ted  in the Consortium upon the s o l ic i ta t io n  of the 
State Department, had spent much time and money in acting as an 
instrument o f the American Far Eastern po licy , and that they would not 
continue th e ir  e f fo r ts  unless the government renewed i ts  request and
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gave the American group i ts  fu l l  support.36 As Bryan recalled i t ,  the 
American group insisted on government assurance that no other American 
financiers would be permitted to enter the loan and that the American 
group would control future loans. The group also demanded that the 
loan was to be secured by control of Chinese government revenues, and 
th a t ,  i f  necessary, the government would use force in cooperation with  
other powers to compel China to l iv e  up to the terms of the c o n tra c t .37
President Wilson and almost a l l  his associates were against 
continued p art ic ip a tio n  in an enterprise which they believed would 
establish a monopoly of loans fo r  a small group of bankers to the 
exclusion of many others and, above a l l ,  in te r fe re  with China's freedom 
and independence. D iffe r in g  substantia lly  from President T a f t ’ s d o lla r  
diplomacy, Wilson did not l ik e  to advance American p o l i t ic a l  in terests  
by encouraging a group of financiers to p art ic ip a te  in an in ternational  
.competition fo r  special p ro f i ts  and r ig h t s .38
The President decided to withdraw American support from the 
Consortium. He issued a statement on 18 March 1913 which marked a 
radical change in American foreign policy and occupied a s ig n if ic a n t  
page in the annals of Si no-American re la tio n s :
The representatives of the bankers through whom the administra­
tion was approached declared that they would continue to seek their 
share of the loan under the proposed agreements only if expressly 
requested to do so by the Government. The administration has 
declined to make such request, because it did not approve the 
conditions of the loan or the implications of responsibility on its 
own part which it was plainly told would be involved in the request.
The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the 
administrative independence of China itself, and this administration 
does not feel that it ought, even by implication, to be a party 
to those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would 
be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake the loan might 
conceivably go the length in some unhappy contingency Of forcible 
interference in the financial, and even the political, affairs of
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that great oriental State, just now awakening to a consciousness of 
its power and of its obligations to its people. The conditions 
include not only the pledging of particular taxes, some of them 
antiquated and burdensome, to secure the loan, but also the 
administration of those taxes by foreign agents. The responsibility 
on the part of our Government implied in the encouragement of a loan 
thus secured and administered is plain enough and is obnoxious to 
the principles upon which the government of our people rests.
The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous of 
promoting the most extended and intimate trade relationship between 
this country and the Chinese Republic. The present administration 
will urge and support the legislative measures necessary to give 
American merchants, manufacturers, contractors, and engineers the 
banking and other financial facilities which they now lack and 
without which they are at a serious disadvantage as compared with 
their industrial and commercial rivals. This is its duty. This 
is the main material interest of its citizens in the development 
of China. Our interests are those of the open door— a door of 
friendship and mutual advantage. This is the only door we care to 
enter. 39
In a telephone conversation with the State Department, 
representatives o f the American group were told to consider Wilson's 
statement as the government's reply to the group's request as to i ts  
future conduct in the loan nego tia tion s .1' 0 Upon learning the decision 
o f the government, the American group immediately n o ti f ie d  the Secretary 
o f  State that i t  was withdrawing from the six-power Consortium in 
regard to the Reorganization Loan.1' 1 I t  n o tif ie d  the other f iv e  groups 
that i t  would remain bound by the sextuple agreement o f 18 June 1912 
u n ti l  i ts  term ination.A2 A statement was issued to the press on the 
same day:
As the American group has been ready to serve the Administration 
in the past, irrespective of the heavy risks involved, so it was 
disposed to serve the present Administration if so requested. But 
differing to the policy now declared, the group has withdrawn 
entirely from the Chinese loan negotiations and has so advised the
u 3European and Japanese banking groups.
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The American group took th is  occasion to n o tify  the State 
Department o f the commitments to which i t  already was a party. The 
important commitments were the Hukuang Loan Agreement, a one-fourth  
share in the Currency Reform Loan advance, and a one-sixth share in the 
Reorganization Loan advance.44 In regard to commitments such as the 
Hukuang agreement and the currency reform loan, which the American 
group already had undertaken, i t  delegated the In ternational Banking 
Corporation to act fo r  i t  in China.45
Although £6,000,000 of the authorized Hukuang railways loan 
was issued on 15 June 1911, construction was delayed by the Chinese 
Revolution u n ti l  the f a l l  of 1913. On 12 September 1913, China 
issued f in a l  and detailed  regulations fo r  the transfer and expenditure 
of loan funds and fo r  carrying out the construction and purchase of  
m ateria ls . These regulations were accepted by the Consortium banks.46 
This marked the commencement of the Hukuang railway pro ject. By 1927, 
however, only 286 miles of the B rit is h  section from Wuchang to Changsha 
had been constructed, and about 75 miles o f the German section from 
Hankow toward Ichang. On the so-called American section, no 
construction had been done.47 With the withdrawal o f the American 
in terests  from the Consortium, the United States, fo r  a short time a t  
le a s t ,  ended i ts  e f fo r t  in China and l e f t  the f ie ld  of investment in 
China.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States loomed 
as the greatest industr ia l nation on earth and enjoyed the greatest  
prosperity i t  ever had witnessed since the founding of the republic . 
But prosperity brought a series of new problems. America's r is e  to 
world power la rg e ly  was the consequence of i ts  unique geographic 
position , abundant natural resources, and the dynamic energy of i ts  
people. Throughout the nineteenth century, the American people had 
devoted themselves to in ternal development and continental expansion 
with l i t t l e  entanglement with the outside world. By the turn o f the 
century, American continental expansion had been brought to an abrupt 
end by the Great P ac if ic . The completion o f western settlement and 
the close o f the f r o n t ie r ,  together with the widespread agrarian  
distress of the 1890s,1 created great anxiety among the people and 
compelled them to look fo r  new ways to solve th e ir  problems.
The tremendous growth of American industry a f te r  the C iv il  
War spawned, perhaps in e v ita b ly , a huge surplus of domestic 
manufacturing which was becoming increasingly d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the nation 
to absorb.2 More and more people had come to see the importance of  
acquiring new overseas markets and the necessity of discarding the 
tra d it io n a l is o la t io n is t  foreign policy inherited  from the Founding 
Fathers. Immediate economic need prepared people to accept an
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expansionist policy as a tool to sustain the nation's strength and 
prosperity.
The Spanish-American War of 1898 marked a s ig n if ic a n t  turning  
point in American foreign po licy. With the annexation of Puerto 
Rico, establishment of a protectorate over Cuba, and the seizure of 
Panama, complete American control was established over the Caribbean.
The occupation of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, and the Philippines extended 
the new American f ro n t ie r  across the Pacific  to the Far East. The 
United States suddenly had become a fu l l - f le d g e d  world power with 
possessions and colonies in the Caribbean and the P ac if ic . Overseas 
expansion marked a complete breakdown of America's physical iso la tion  
of early  days. Success brought joy to the people and muted the 
protest of the anti imperial 1st crusaders.3
What was more s ig n if ic a n t ,  however, was that the occupation 
of the Philippines had brought America so close to the legendary China 
market. The American dream of a great China market, rich and l im it le s s ,  
was as old as the American nation. Since Daniel Webster's days, some 
American diplomatists predicted that American trade with the Far East 
would eventually exceed i ts  trade with Europe.k The Spanish-American 
War revived and deepened American in teres t in the Far Eastern trade.
An enthusiastic senator proclaimed, that exciting  summer of 1898,
The booming guns of Dewey's battleships sounded a new note on the
Pacific shores, a note that has echoed and reechoed around the
world, and that note is that we are on the Pacific, that we are
there to stay, and that we are there to protect our rights,
promote our interests, and get our shares of the trade and commerce
5of the opulent Orient.
Developments in the Far East were not, however, favorable to 
American commercial expansion in that region. The gate of the Chinese
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Empire was forced open by B rit ish  soldiers and gunboats. From the 
Opium War of 1840 onward, China gradually was reduced to the status of 
a semicolony through the unequal t re a t ie s  imposed on China by the 
im p e r ia lis t  powers.6 The Sino-Japanese War o f 1894-1895 revealed the 
fa ta l weakness of the empire and brought a flood of speculators and 
concessionaires to the China scene. The Treaty Powers and Japan, 
competing with each other, busily carved out great portions o f China 
as th e ir  exclusive spheres of in teres t w ithin which they claimed to 
enjoy p re fe ren tia l rights in the granting by China o f railway and other 
industr ia l concessions. By the turn of the century, China faced the 
imminent danger o f  being partit ioned by the im p eria lis t  powers.
American in terests  in China, which had grown out of the trade 
with Canton in i t ia te d  at the close o f the eighteenth century ,7 were 
safeguarded by the most favored nation p r in c ip le  incorporated in the 
f i r s t  American-Chinese t re a ty - - th e  Treaty of Wanghia o f 1844— and 
by the rights and priv ileges embodied 14 years la te r  in .th e  Treaty of 
T ie n ts in .8 Except fo r a b r ie f  experience in the jo in t  m il i ta ry  
operation to suppress the Boxer Uprising, the United States never had 
made war on China. Neither had i t  sought outright t e r r i t o r i a l  
concessions from China. Nevertheless, the United States did not 
hesitate  to in s is t  on i ts  r ig h t  to share whatever priv ileges England, 
France, and other Treaty Powers might wring from the impotent Chinese 
government by a force of arms. I t  was not averse to enjoying the 
f r u i ts  of European imperialism.
The United States was a latecomer to the China scene. When i t  
decided to claim interests  in the empire, the European powers and
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Japan already had consolidated th e ir  strongholds in China. There was 
l i t t l e  room l e f t  fo r American in terests  to expand. At a time when 
world markets were most needed, and ju s t  as the acquisition o f the 
Philippines provided a base fo r  American f inancia l and commercial 
expansion in the Far East, American businessmen saw the doors 
swinging shut in China. The exclusive spheres of in te re s t  blocked 
the way fo r  American businessmen to f u l f i l l  th e ir  economic ambitions 
in the China market.
Unless the United States promptly did something to protect 
i ts  in te re s ts , American businessmen, f in an c ie rs , and government 
leaders f e l t ,  i t  might f ind i t s e l f  completely excluded from the 
potentia l China market. The h is to r ic  in te re s t  in Pac ific  expansion 
and in the China market soon convinced them that the opportunity to 
strengthen America's position in the Far East by taking the Philippines  
was an opportunity tha t must not be neglected. Something had to be 
done to prevent the potentia l markets in the Far East from fa l l in g  
under the control or domination of the European trade r iv a ls  and 
Japan. The s itua tion  created a demand fo r  a more vigorous Far Eastern 
policy and the demand fo r  prompt American action as a world power.
In 1898, that meant imperialism.
Although the greatest industr ia l power among the nations, the 
United States was not ye t strong enough to compete with the European 
powers m i l i t a r i l y .  Besides, American public sentiment, except fo r  a 
b r ie f  period during the Spanish-American War, was strongly against 
overseas t e r r i t o r ia l  acquisiton and the use of force in in ternational  
re la t io n s . Something new had to be worked out to meet the urgent need 
fo r  American commercial and f inancia l expansion.
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Out of th is  need fo r  overseas commercial expansion came the 
f i r s t  formal expression of a policy which had i ts  roots in the Treaty 
of Wanghia in 1844: the Open Door Notes. In response to the need fo r  
overseas commercial expansion and mounting im p e r ia lis t  economic r iv a lr y  
in. China, John Hay's a r t ic u la t io n  of the Open Door Policy was designed 
to secure and preserve access to the China market fo r  American business 
in te res ts . I t  was derived from the conviction th a t ,  in f a i r  and square 
competition, the overwhelming economic power o f the United States 
eventually would triumpth over European and Japanese business in terests  
in China.
The Open Door Policy consisted of two basic princip les: the
equality  of commercial opportunity to a l l  powers in China and the 
preservation of China's t e r r i t o r ia l  and adm inistrative in te g r i ty .  Both 
principles were invoked to serve the American purpose of commercial 
expansion. Without the assurance of equality  of opportunity, the 
United States could not possibly promote i ts  own business in terests  
in China, especially  not in those economically important areas that  
already had been marked out by the other powers as th e ir  spheres of 
influence. I f  China were carved up among the powers and ceased to be 
an independent s ta te , the United States never would be able to enter 
the China market.
The a ffirm ation  of the Open Door Policy was not deemed 
inconsistent with the establishment o f spheres of influence, neither had 
i t  prevented the creation of special in teres ts . The United States 
Government had no in tention of challenging the established in terests  of 
the powers. The primary concern of the American government was to
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secure i ts  share of the China market, not protect the rights and 
in terests  of the Chinese Empire. Indeed, John Hay's f i r s t  round of  
Open Door Notes to the powers concerned sole ly  the equality  of  
commercial opportunity, accepted the ex isting spheres of influence in 
China, and mentioned nothing about the empire's t e r r i t o r i a l  and 
p o l i t ic a l  in te g r i ty .  The la t t e r  p rin c ip le  was added to the Open Door 
Policy with an awareness that China's existence as a sovereign state  
would serve the best in terests  o f the United States.
In plain words, an open door in China meant that she should 
welcome the im p e r ia lis t  powers with open arms when they descended 
to grab her resources and promote th e ir  personal in teres ts . The 
prin c ip le  o f equality  meant th a t everybody should have a share. Any 
power, having once established a sphere o f in te re s t in China, should 
continue to enjoy i t s  priv ileges without disturbing the priv ileges  
of other nations which had no spheres o f in teres t in China. The 
preservation o f China's in te g r i ty  meant that China should not be 
divided into separate colonies but be preserved fo r  co lle c t ive  
exploration and enjoyment. The policy was extremely hardheaded and 
p ra c t ic a l .  In urging the powers to accept the Open Door Policy, the 
American government acted in the best in terests  of the United States 
to safeguard the country's commercial in terests  in China at a time when 
these in terests  appeared to be seriously threatened by the r iv a l  
schemes of the European powers and Japan.
President William Howard Taft  came to o f f ic e  a t the beginning 
of one of the greatest eras of expansion of American foreign investment 
in h is to ry .9 Unlike his predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt, whose major
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concern was America's m i l i ta r y  strength and p o l i t ic a l  influence, Taft  
was more interested in American commercial expansion. He declared 
tha t his policy was one of "substituting do llars  fo r  b u lle ts ,"  and 
that i t  was the policy o f the United States to "extend a l l  proper 
support to every leg itim ate  and beneficial American enterprise  
abroad.1,10
T a ft 's  Secretary of S tate , Philander Knox, also was an
enthusiastic proponent of overseas economic expansion and a d isc ip le
o f T a f t 's  d o lla r  diplomacy. In a long State Department memorandum
of September 1909, Knox pointed out that
the nations that finance the great Chinese railways and other 
enterprises will be foremost in the affairs of China and the 
participation of American capital in these investments give the 
voice of the United States more authority in political controversies 
in that country.
So long as the United States holds the Philippines, the 
dominatin of China by other nations to our exclusion would be 
fraught with danger and it is unthinkable that this country should 
be squeezed out of any combination exercising an influence at 
Peking. . . . Our interests in Asiatic waters require the 
prevention of the establishment of predominant interests and 
influences at Peking on the part of other powers and that American 
prestige in China be undiminished. 11
From the beginning o f th e ir  adm inistration, Knox and T a ft  took 
the in i t i a t i v e  in promoting American financia l in terests  in China. For 
four years they endeavored to pump American cap ita l into China. Their 
tac tics  were to demand the admission of American c a p ita l ,  on terms of 
equal p a r t ic ip a t io n , into every foreigh loan floated  by China.
American railway ventures in central and southern China were but part  
of this grand campaign to secure a foothold in the China market fo r  
American business and f inancia l in teres ts . The Hukuang loan was one of
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the most important loans the United States had intruded into during 
T a ft 's  administration.
A fte r  the cancellation of the Hankow-Canton concession, the 
provincials t r ie d ,  with l i t t l e  success, to construct the railways 
through th e ir  e f fo r ts .  The capita l required fo r  the construction of 
China's railways was enormous and fa r  beyond the a b i l i t y  o f China's 
f inancia l organizations of that time. Despite strong provincial 
opposition, the Chinese government again assumed the resp ons ib ili ty  
of constructing the nation's railways through i ts  railway n a t io n a li ­
zation program and turned to seek foreign financia l assistance.
The o rig ina l Hukuang loan agreement was in i t ia le d  on 6 June *
1909 between the Chinese government and representatives of the B r i t is h ,  
French, and German banking groups. During th e ir  intergroup 
negotiations, the three European groups had, on two occasions, 
extended an in v ita t io n  to American Bankers to share in the loan.
Despite the s o lic ita t io n s  of the State Department, American financiers  
fa i le d  to show much in te re s t in the enterprise. The three European 
banking groups undertook negotiations with China on the assumption 
that American c a p ita l is ts  did not want to p a r t ic ip a te .
The State Department did not l ik e  to see th is  great project  
f a l l  e n t ire ly  into the hands of European financiers . When the loan 
negotiations were about to be concluded, the State Department 
declared that the promises made by the Chinese government to M in ister  
Conger in 1903 and 1904 gave the United States a 50 percent share of 
the Hankow-Szechuan l in e ,  and that an American banking group was ready 
to p a rt ic ip a te  in the Hukuang project. The European powers and the
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Chinese government, annoyed by America's belated claim, concluded the 
loan with l i t t l e  a tten tion  paid to American protests.
By invoking the Open Door Policy in an e f fo r t  to block imperial 
sanction o f  the agreement, the American State Department succeeded in 
persuading the powers and China to accept American p art ic ip a tio n  in 
p r in c ip le .  The consequential negotiations were extremely complicated 
and strenuous. The American government refused to accept the European 
o ffe r  of a one-fourth share in the Hankow-Szechuan loan and demanded a 
25 percent share o f the e n t ire  loan with absolute equality  in every 
p a rt ic u la r .  The uncompromising position of the United States enraged 
the powers and China; they decided to close the loan as i t  stood.
Facing the imminent danger of American interests  being excluded 
e n t ire ly  from the enterprise , President Ta ft  intervened personally by 
taking the extraordinary measure of communicating d ire c t ly  to the 
Prince Regent of China on behalf of private  American business in teres ts .  
Under pressure from the United States, the Chinese Imperial Government 
agreed to wait u n ti l  the United States had se ttled  i ts  differences  
with the European powers. Clashing interests  created numerous 
problems and delayed the loan fo r  almost a year. As a re s u lt ,  the 
loand was not concluded u n ti l  May 1911.
The loan negotiations had been carried on against the backdrop 
of an impending Chinese Revolution. The unpopularity of the Hukuang 
Iona, the f ie rc e  competition among the banking groups and th e ir  
governments, and the endless delay of the project combined to s t i f fe n  
provincial opposition and lead to the outbreak of the Revolution. 
Fighting began in the Szechuan province with a popular uprising against
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the Hukuang railway program which soon developed into a nationwide 
revolution against the imperial system under the Manchus. The 
Revolution had become more anti-Manchu than an tifo re ig n ; but, to an 
extent, the Manchu rulers were scapegoats fo r  the foreign money 
lenders and concessionaires because th e ir  s e lf is h  claims and disputes, 
a f te r  a l l , had in ten s if ie d  provincial opposition and h o s t i l i t y  
toward the Imperial Government.
The in i t i a t i v e  to force American entry into the Hukuang loan 
came almost e n t ire ly  from the American government. I t  was the State 
Department, not Wall S tree t, that h a s t i ly  organized the American 
group to serve as a sem io ff ic ia l instrument in carrying out the policy  
of the government and led the American group during the en tire  proceeding
of the negotiations. T a f t 's  d o lla r  diplomacy had fa r  from f u l f i l l e d
i ts  pronounced objectives. I t  had not stimulated in ternational  
cooperation but, ra th er, in ten s if ie d  in ternational competition. The 
policy impaired rather than strengthened China's in te g r i ty  and and in 
a sense contributed d ire c t ly  to the d is in tegration  of the Chinese 
Empire. During the negotiations, more than once the Open Door Policy  
was invoked by d i f fe re n t  groups to defend th e ir  positions and to 
ju s t i f y  th e ir  claims. I r o n ic a l ly ,  the Open Door Policy, with i ts  
professed prupose of maintaining China's sovereignty, now had become 
an e f fe c t iv e  weapon in in ternational r iv a lr y  in China and created 
chaos, disorder, and misfortune fo r  that land and i ts  government.
A fte r  the upheaval of the revo lu tion , the new Chinese
government was confronted with enormous d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  f inancia l  
and adm inistrative. To avoid u t te r  collapse, the government under
10.6
General Yuan Shih-kai negotiated a large Reorganization Loan with the 
In ternational Consortium, which had been enlarged from i t s  o rig ina l  
four members to a six-member Consortium with the p artic ipa tion  of  
Russia and Japan. Very harsh terms were attached to the loan. The
powers b luntly  requested to p a rt ic ip a te  in the reorganization of the 
Chinese government. By taking advantage of the chaotic s itua tion  in 
China, the Consortium powers again threatened i ts  independence.
Upon the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson, the American group 
in the Consortium immediately asked the new administration fo r f u l l  
governmental support of the Consortium. Wilson and his associates 
considere the terms of the Reorganization Loan as subversive to 
China's adm inistrative in te g r i ty  and withdrew American support from 
the Consortium. With th is  drastic  change of po licy , the American 
bankers had no choice but to withdraw from the Consortium, thus 
temporarily ending American economic a c t iv i ty  in China.
American withdrawal from the Consortium did not help to 
strengthen China's in te g r i ty .  Other Consortium powers tightened 
rather than loosened th e ir  control over China's f inancia l and 
p o l i t ic a l  a f fa i r s .  American influence in that country suffered a 
general decline and the position o f the United States in China d a ily  
became less tenable. This development was inconsistent with the 
American policy of overseas commercial expansion formulated a t the 
turn of the century. Under such circumstances, Wilson d ra s t ic a l ly  
revised his China policy during his second term. America 
reentered the China market through the organization o f the new 
Consortium.12
CHAPTER 5 ENDNOTES
^ric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern
American Reform (New York: Knopf and Company, 1952), pp. 52-53,
2Thomas J. McCormick, China Market: America 's Quest for
Informal Empire 1893-1901 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 22.
3 •Robert J. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1968), see conclusion, pp. 215-239.
*tWhitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 133.
5Foster Rhea Dulles, China and America: The Story of Their
Relations Since 1784 (New York: Kennikat Press, 1976), p. 101.
6John K, Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 213-263.
7John K. Fairbank and Edwin 0. Reischauer, China: Tradition
and Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), pp. 271-
277.
8Herbert H. Gowen and Josef Washington Hall, An Outline History 
of China (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1927), pp. 255-257;
E. R. Hughes, The Invasion of China by the Western World (New York:
The MaOMillan Company, 1938), pp. 26—28.
9 •Griswold, loc. cit.
10Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1912), pp. vii-xxvii, Taft's Annual 
Message to Congress, December 3, 1912.
11Griswold, op. cit., pp. 144-145, citing the State Department 
Memorandum, The Chinese Loan, September 30, 1909, Knox papers.
12Li Tien-yi, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy 1913-1917 (New 
York: University of Kansas City Press-Twayne Publishers, 1952), p. 213.
107
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Foreign Relations of the United States. Washington: Government
Printing O ff ice , 1901-1905, 1908-1913.
MacMurray, J. V. A. Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China
1894-1919, Vol. I .  New York: Oxford University Press, 1921.
R ockhill, William W. Treaties and Conventions with or Concerning China 
and Korea 1894-1904. Washington: Government Printing O ff ice ,
1904.
A rt ic le s
Braisted, William R. "The United States and the American China
Development Company." Far Eastern' Quarterly, XI (1952), 147-165.
Dennett, T y le r , "The Open Door Policy as In tervention ."  The Annals3 
168 (Ju ly , 1933), 78-83.
Esthus, Raymond, "The Changing Concept o f the Open Door, 1899-1910."
Mississippi Valley Historical Review3 46 (December, 1959), 435-454.
Knox, Philander, C. "The Achievements o f Dollar Diplomacy." Saturday 
Evening Post, 184 (March 9, 1912), 3-4.
New York Herald. E d ito r ia l .  May 3, 1911.
Books
Bau Mingchien, Joshua, The Foreign Relations of China: A History
and a Survey. New York: Fleming H. Revel! Company, 1921.
Beale, Howard K. Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World 
Power. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956.
Beisner, Robert L. Twelve Against Empire. New York: McGraw-Hill,
1968.
108
109
Blakeslee, George H. , ed. Recent Development in China. New York:
G. E. Stechert and Company, 1913.
Cameron, Meribeth E. The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1931.
Campbell, Charles S. Special Business Interests and the Open Door.
New Haven: Yale University  Press, 1951.
Clark, Grover. Economic Rivalries in China. New Haven: * Yale
University Press, 1932.
Clyde, Paul H. A History of the Modern and Contemporary Far East .
New York: Prentice-Hal1, Incorporated, 1937.
Clyde, Paul H. United States Rolicy Toward China: Diplomatic and
Public Documents 1839-1939. Durham: Duke University  Press, 1940.
Clyde, Paul H. The Far East: A History of the Western Impact and the
Eastern Response 1830-1965. 4th ed. New York: Prentice-Hal1,
Incorporated, 1966.
Cohen, Warren I .  America's Response to China. New York: John Wiley
and Sons, Incorporated, 1971.
Cohen, Warren I .  The Chinese Connection. New York: Columbia
University  Press, 1978.
Coolidge, Archibald C. The United States as a World Power. New
York: The MacMillan Company, 1908.
Croly, Herbert. Willard Straight. New York: The MacMillan Company*
1924.
C urtis , Lionel. The Capital Question of China. London: MacMillan
and Company, Limited, 1932.
Daniels, Josephus. The Wilson Era: Years of Peace 1910-1917. Chapel
H i l l :  The University  of North Carolina Press, 1944.
Dennett, Ty ler . John Hay. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1934.
Dennis,. A lfred L. P. Adventure in American Diplomacy 1896-1906.
New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1969.
Dulles, Foster Rhea. America in the Pacific: A Century of Expansion.
Boston and New York: Houghton M i f f l in  Company, 1932.
Dulles, Foster Rhea. America's Rise to World Power, 1898-1954. New 
York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1955.
110
Dull es, Foster Rhea. Prelude to World Power, American Diplomatic 
History 1860-1900. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965.
Dull es Foster Rhea. China and America: The Story of Their Relations
Since 1784. New York: Kennikat Press, 1976.
Fairbank, John K. , ed. The Cambridge History of China, Vol. .10. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
Fairbank, John K. The United States and China. 4th ed. Cambridge: 
Harvard University  Press, 1979.
Fairbank, John K. and Edwin 0. Reischauer. China: Tradition and
Transformation. Boston: Houghton M i f f l in  Company, 1978.
F ie ld , Frederick, V. American Participation in the China Consortiums. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931.
Goldman, Eric F. Rendezvous with Destiny; A History of M o d e m  American 
Reform. New York: Knopf and Company, 1952.
Gowen, Herbert H. and Joseph Washington H a ll.  An Outline History of 
China. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1927.
Graebner, Norman A. Empire on the Pacific. New York: Ronald Press 
Company, 1955.
Griswold, Whitney. The Far Eastern Policy of the United States. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.
Hughes, E. R. The Invasion of China by the Western World. New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1938.
I r iy e ,  Akira. Across the Pacific. New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, Incorporated, 1967.
Is ra e l ,  Jerry. Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China, 
1905-1921. Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1971.
Jessup, P h i l l ip  C. Elihu Root, Vols. I and I I .  New York: Dodd,
Mead and Company, 1938.
Kia-Ngau, Chang. China's Struggle for Railr‘oa.d Development. New York: 
The John Day Compamy, 1943.
Lamont, Thomas W. and Henry P. Davison. The Record of a Useful Life.
New York: The MacMillan Company, 1933.
Lewis, Cleona. America's Stake in International Investments. Washing­
ton: Brookings In s t i tu te ,  1938.
I l l
Maurer, Herrymon. Collision of East and West. Chicago: Henry Reqnery 
Company, 1951.
McCormick, Thomas J. China Market: America’s. Quest for Informal 
Empire 1893-1901. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967.
McKee, Delber L. Chinese Exclusion Versus the Open Door Policy 1900- 
1906. D etro it:  Wayne State University  Press, 1977.
Michael, Franz H. and G. E. Taylor. The Far East in the M o d e m  World. 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956.
M il la rd ,  Thomas F. America and the Far East. New York: M offat, Yard 
and Company, 1909.
Mil la rd , Thomas F. China: Where it is. Today and Why. New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1928.
Overlach, Theodore W. Foreign Financial Control in China. New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1919.
Reid, John G ilb e rt .  The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912. 
Berkeley: University  of C a lifo rn ia  Press, 1935.
Remer, Charles F. Foreign Investments in China. New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1933.
S tr inger, H. China; A New Aspect. London: H. F. and G. Witherby,
1929.
T ie n -y i ,  L i .  Woodrow Wilson’s China Policy 1913-1917.. New York: 
University of Kansas City Press-Twayne Publishers, 1952.
Tw itchett, D. and John K. Fairbank. The Cambridge History of China,
Vol. 11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Varg, Paul A. Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W. W. Rockhill 
Urbana: University  of I l l i n o is  Press, 1952.
Varg, Paul A. The Making of a Myth; The United States and China 1897- 
1912. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968,
Vevier, Charles. The United- States and China 1906-1913; A Study of 
Finance and Diplomacy. New Brunswick: Rutgers University  Press,
1955.
Wakeman, Frederick, Jr. The Fall of Imperial China. New York: The
Free Press, 1975.
WiHiams, Wi 11 iam A. The Shaping of American Diplomacy 1750-1955 
Vols. I and I I .  Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964.
112
Williams, William A. The'Roots of the M o d e m  American Empire. New 
York: Random House, 1969.
Williams, Will aim A. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. New York:
Dell Publishing Company, Incorporated, 1972.
Willoughby, Westel W. Foreign Rights and Intersts in Chinas VOls. I 
and I I .  , Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1920.
Wright, Mary C. China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900-1913. New
Haven: Yale University  Press, 1968.
Young, Marilyn B la t t .  The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy
1895-1901. Cambridge: Harvard University  Press, 1968.
